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JUVENILE COURT: THE LEGAL PROCESS
AS A REHABILITATIVE TOOL
Juvenile courts in Washington are required to provide for the "care,
custody and discipline of a dependent or delinquent child"1 under the
age of eighteen. 2 Although the courts are atiempting to carry out this
statutory mandate in order to reach the legislative goal of juvenile
rehabilitation, 3 there is growing dissatisfaction with their effectiveness
1. The basic sources of juvenile court law in the State of Washington are WASH.
REV. CODE tit. 13 (1974) and WASH. JUV. Cr. R. (1968) (effective Jan. 10, 1969).
WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.140 (1974) states the underlying purpose of the juvenile
correctional system:
This chapter shall be liberally construed to the end that its purpose may be car-
ried out, to wit: that the care, custody and discipline of a dependent or delinquent
child as defined in this chapter shall approximate as nearly as may be that which
should be given by its parents ....
A delinquent child is defined as a minor child under the age of eighteen years who is
found to have violated either federal, state, or local law and who has been referred to
the juvenile court. Id. § 13.04.010. A dependent child, on the other hand, may be
any child under eighteen who is found to be neglected (e.g., abandoned, living in a
home where injurious living conditions exist, in need of protective custody or shelter,
or in need of medical care necessary for his well-being), rebellious (e.g., one who is
truant, who has no settled place of abode, who uses intoxicating liquors or drugs,
who frequents the company of reputed criminals, vagrants, or prostitutes, or who is
otherwise in danger of leading an immoral or dissolute life), or incorrigible (i.e.,
beyond the control and power of his parents, guardian, or custodian by reason of
his conduct or nature). Id. § 13.04.010. All children who have been adjudicated de-
linquent or dependent are considered wards of the state "and their persons shall be
subject to the custody, care, guardianship and control of the court ...." Id. Once a
minor is found to be dependent or delinquent and thus made a ward of the state, he
is subject to the continuing jurisdiction of juvenile court until his condition of de-
pendency or delinquency ends. In re Boatman, 73 Wn. 2d 364, 438 P.2d 600 (1968).
The study on which this comment is based was concerned only with those children
adjudged to be delinquent or dependent-incorrigible, i.e., those classifications ofjuvenile
offense for which, at the time of this study, the ultimate sanction that could be
imposed was commitment to a state juvenile institution. See note 46 infra, and ac-
companying text. It was to this category of children that the due process guarantees
first enunciated in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), see note 52 and accompanying
text infra, were directed.
2. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010 (1974). In January 1975, the Supreme
Couit of Washington, in In re Carson, 84 Wn. 2d 969, 530 P.2d 331 (1975), held
that juvenile court jurisdiction ends when a person turns eighteen years of age since
the thrust of the majority statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.010 (1974), is that
"all persons shall be deemed and taken to be of full age for all purposes at the age
of eighteen years," and that "the better reasoning and result would be that the juvenile
court may exercise jurisdiction over only minors . 84 Wn. 2d at 971, 530 P.2d
at 332 (emphasis in original).
3. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.06.010 (1974) indicates this rehabilitative goal:
It is the intention of the legislature in enacting this chapter ... to rehabilitate
juvenile offenders, and to reduce the necessity for commitment of juveniles to
state juveniles correctional institutions by strengthening and improving the super-
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in reaching this rehabilitative goal. 4 As a result, there is also an in-
creasing disenchantment with the traditional view concerning the
proper role of the juvenile court process.
Two contradictory models of the juvenile process have developed.
Advocates of the first, a traditional sociological-paternalistic view,5
believe that the best manner in which to rehabilitate youngsters is
vision ofjuveniles placed on probation by the juvenile courts of this state.
This statute is a portion of a chapter authorizing special supervised probation pro-
grams in the various counties to be jointly funded from state and local sources.
4. One Philadelphia juvenile court judge expressed this dissatisfaction by stating:
A contact with the Juvenile Court not only is unlikely to assist a youngster to
become a better citizen but, according to respectable theory today, it is likely to
lead him into further "delinquency."
L. FORER, "No ONE WILL LISSEN" 105 (1970). See also U.S. TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY, THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 1 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. As Oran Ketcham. a long-time observer
ofjuvenile courts, has noted:
The way to measure success or failure is by the number of reappearances of the
same youngster. Each reappearance represents a defeat for the judge and a
serious challenge to the efficacy of the juvenile court philosophy. Statistics on
recidivism indicate that many juveniles are coming out of the first skirmish with
the courts unhelped and unrehabilitated.
Ketcham, The Juvenile Court for 1975, 40 SOCIAL SERVICE REV. 285 (1966). The
results of this author's study presented in this comment challenge the assumption
that formal processing through the juvenile court is necessarily deleterious.
5. The development of this view has been traced to the parens patriae jurisdiction
of English chancery courts. See, e.g., H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES
2-5 (1927); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 1187 (1970). The concept of parens patriae was used to describe the power of
the state to act in the place of the parent in the best interests of the child. See Mennel,
Origins of the Juvenile Court: Changing Perspectives on the Legal Rights of Juvenile
Delinquents, 18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 68 (1972). This doctrine became an integral
part of juvenile proceedings in the United States with Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9
(Sup. Ct. Pa. 1839).
The function of the traditional juvenile court proceeding was to diagnose the
child's condition and to prescribe for his needs-not to judge his acts or to decide
his rights. A non-legal social setting was to be provided to treat the child in his own
best interests. Hearings were to be informal and confidential; the court process as a
whole was paternalistic rather than adversary. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 2-4. Although the sociological model of juvenile court proceedings
that grew out of parens patriae was applied to delinquency and dependency cases
alike, it is interesting to note that the origins of juvenile court delinquency jurisdiction
lie primarily in English criminal law, rather than in chancery, where minors were
punished as adults. See H. Lou, supra at 7; R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL
HISTORY 134-35 (1923).
One commentator has remarked on the ease with which the sociological model
took root in the United States. See A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY (1969). Platt concludes that the juvenile court did not create a new
system of justice when it was introduced to the United States but rather reinforced
the middle class bias of 19th century reformers who set high standards for the con-
duct of family affairs and sought to inject those standards into the lives of lower
class working families. Id. at 134-36. "[The reformers] implicitly assumed the
'natural' dependence of adolescents and created a special court to impose sanctions on
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through an informal court process with a minimum of formal proce-
dures. Supporters of the legal-due process view, 6 on the other hand,
feel that the juvenile offender can best be rehabilitated through a
more formalized judicial procedure which is similar to an adult crim-
inal proceeding.
The author's study, reported in this comment, had two objectives.
First, it attempted to determine whether a juvenile's experience with
premature independence and behavior unbecoming to youth." Id. at 176. The im-
position of control was total:
Historical idiosyncracies gave us a doubtful assumption of power over children.
With the quasi-legal concept of-parens patriae to brace it, this assumption of
power blended well with the earlier humanitarian traditions in the churches and
other charitable organizations regarding child care and child-saving. The juvenile
court is thus the product of paternal error and maternal generosity, which is a
not unusual genesis of illegitimacy.
N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 157
(1970). See generally Schultz, The Cycle of Juvenile Court History, 19 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 457 (1973).
6. Proponents of the due process model challenged the presumption that an in-
formal sociological orientation was beneficial to the youthful offender. An early advo-
cate of the introduction of constitutional due process guarantees into the juvenile
court process and former dean of the University of Michigan Law School, Francis
Allen, observed:
Even if one's interests lie primarily in the problems of treatment of offenders
and related matters, it should be recognized that the existence of the criminal
presupposes a crime and that the problems of treatment are derivative in the
sense that they depend upon the determination by the law-giving agencies that
certain sorts of behavior are crimes.
F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 125 (1964). The notion of a fact-
finding procedure which would insure as nearly as possible that the offense was in
fact committed by the person over whom state control is exercised was lacking from
the sociological model:
The juvenile court movement was "anti-legal" in the sense that it encouraged
minimum procedural formality and maximum dependency on extra-legal re-
sources. The judges were authorized to investigate the character and social back-
ground of both "pre-delinquent" and "delinquent" children. They examined
personal motivation as well as criminal intent, seeking to identify the moral
reputation of the problematic children.
A. PLAT-r, supra note 5, at 141 (footnote omitted).
This shift to the due process model was justified in tha: 'he punitive aspects of the
treatment model were becoming increasingly apparent. As ae Court in In re Gault
concluded: "A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be
'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in serious-
ness to a felony prosecution." 387 U.S. at 36. The Court also-added: "[The term
'delinquent'] has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term 'criminal'
applied to adults." Id. at 24. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), where the Court
held that allegations of delinquency must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion stated:
Although there are no doubt costs to society (and possibly even to the youth
himself) in letting a guilty youth go free, I think here, as in a criminal case, it is
far worse to declare an innocent youth a delinquent.
Id. at 374. See also F. ALLEN, BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 16 (1964). See gen-
erally B. GEORGE, GAULT AND THE JUVENILE COURT REVOLUTION (1968).
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the traditional sociological model or with the legal due process model
is more likely to motivate him to feel positively toward the legal
system. Second, this study attempted to measure the attitudes of the
professionals in the juvenile system (judges, attorneys, and case-
workers) toward the two models. The results of the study, although
not all were statistically significant, 7 indicated that although the pro-
fessionals favored the traditional sociological model, the use of the
An additional rationale for the introduction of adult criminal due process guaran-
tees into the juvenile process where loss of liberty is possible, is that minors typically
serve longer terms whether on probation or incarcerated than if they had been
sentenced by an adult criminal court for the same offense. See S. RUBIN, PSYCHIATRY
AND CRIMINAL LAW 157 (1965); Chase, Schemes and Visions: A Suggested Revision
of Juvenile Sentencing, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 673 (1973). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S.
at 29, where the Court explains that the youthful offender charged therein with de-
linquency by reason of his participation in an obscene phone call (a misdemeanor
under Arizona law) would have been subject to a maximum fine of five to fifty dollars,
or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months, had he been an adult. As a
juvenile, Gerald Gault faced possible commitment to a state juvenile institution for
an indefinite period of up to six years.
Even those who favored the provision of adult criminal due process guarantees
generally in the juvenile court process, however, were reluctant to eradicate com-
pletely the notion that delinquencies be handled in a forum separate from that in
which adult criminal behavior would be tried. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (juvenile not entitled to trial by jury), where the Court
stated:
The imposition of the jury trial on the juvenile court system would not strengthen
greatly, if at all, the factfinding function, and would, contrarily, provide an attri-
tion of the juvenile court's assumed ability to function in a unique manner ...
The juvenile concept held high promise. We are reluctant to say that, despite
disappointments of grave dimensions, it still does not hold promise, and we are
particularly reluctant to say . . . that the system cannot accomplish its rehabil-
itative goals.
Cf. Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wn. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968) (juvenile denied right to
bail). But see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970):
Gault decided that although the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that the
hearing at this stage conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even
of the usual administrative proceeding, the Due Process Clause does require
application during the adjudicatory hearing of " 'the essentials of due process
and fair treatment.'"
397 U.S. at 359 (citations omitted); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (prosecu-
tion as adult after adjudication of delinquency for same crime and subsequent finding
of unfitness for treatment as juvenile violates constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy). See generally Popkin, Flippert & Keiter, Another Look at the Role of
Due Process in Juvenile Court, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 233 (1972).
7. A statistical test known as the chi square test (with Yale's correction for con-
tinuity) was used to analyze the data collected in this study. See G. FERGUSON, STA-
TISTICAL ANALYSIS IN PSYCHOLOGY & EDUCATION 188-89 (3d ed. 1971). When the
results of the chi square test are "significant," it is meant that the probability that a
difference between the two samples would be detected when there was actually no
difference is less than .05. Five per cent is a generally accepted threshold level of
statistical significance. Id. at 149. When the difference between the two samples is
labeled "not significant," the chance is greater than .05 that a difference would be
detected when there actually is none. Subsequent footnotes indicate in which in-
stances the difference between the two samples is significant.
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legal-due process model was more likely to result in the offender's
feeling that the legal system was fair. If, as a result of these positive
feelings toward the legal system, the offender is more likely to become
rehabilitated because of his perception of the legitimacy of the rule of
law,8 then the legal due process model possesses more promise as a
rehabilitative device than does the traditional sociological model.
I. RESEARCH INTO JUVENILE AND PROFESSIONAL
ATTITUDES: THE NEED AND THE METHOD
Although there is disagreement as to the effectiveness of the tradi-
tional approach between the advocates of the sociological viewpoint
and those who would supplant it with a procedure more closely resem-
ling that afforded an adult criminal defendant, 9 there is little empir-
ical data10 which would indicate that one approach is superior to the
8. Although the present study is limited to perceptions of a juvenile's contact with
the court, it is recognized that significant impressions of the legal process are obtained
by interaction with police, detention authorities, training school personnel, and others
in the legal process. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); R. EM-
ERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS (1969); Lefstein, Stapleton, & Teitelbaum, In Search of
Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its Implementation, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 491 (1969).
The socialization of political attitudes in children has been the source of extended
research. See, e.g., D. EASTON & J. DENNIS, CHILDREN IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
(1969); Adelson & O'Neil, Growth of Political Ideas in Adolescence: The Sense of
Community, in THE SEEDS OF POLITICS: YOUTH AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 53
(A. Orum ed. 1972); Easton & Dennis, The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms:
Political Efficacy, 61 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 25 (1967); Koeppen, Children and Com-
pliance, 4 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 545 (1970). See generally F. GREENSTEIN, CHILDREN
AND POLITICS (rev. ed. 1972); H. HYMAN, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION (rev. ed. 1969);
THE POLITICS OF FUTURE CITIZENS (R. Niemi Associates ed. 1974). In this context,
at least one author has suggested that children are able to cope more easily with bru-
tality than with manipulation on the part of authority figures. E. FRIEDENBERG, THE
VANISHING ADOLESCENT 8-10 (1964).
9. Prior to the Gault decision, there were many commentaries on the need for the
adoption of due process guarantees in juvenile proceedings. See generally A. PLATr,
supra note 5; F. ALLEN, supra note 6, at 19; JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD (M. Rosenheim
ed. 1962); Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, 7 CRIME & DE-
LINQUENCY 93 (1961); Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 694 (1966); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts
and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966).
10. When the United States Supreme Court first dealt with the issue of the con-
stitutional rights of those juveniles subject to juvenile court jurisdiction there was
little evidence upon which to support their conclusion that the treatment model of
juvenile proceedings was likely to have a negative impact upon the attitudes of the
juveniles who were its subject. As one author has noted:
There seems to be very little published on the nature of the impact of the [court]
process on the adolescent, but what little there is indicates that the impact is pre-
cisely opposite to that intended. Instead of producing attitudes of rapport and
trust (considered necessary for rehabilitation), the high degree of informality
leads to confusion and lack of perception or understanding of roles and standards.
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other in its ability to rehabilitate the young offender. Therefore, this
research was undertaken to determine which approach is more suc-
cessful in imbuing the offender with a positive feeling about the juve-
nile court system. The basic assumption of this study was that a
youngster's perception of the juvenile legal process will have a signifi-
cant influence on his attitude toward the entire legal framework of his
society. I1 If he perceives the juvenile system as one that is "fundamen-
G. NEWMAN, CHILDREN IN THE COURT-THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION 245
(1967). See also M. MIDONIK, CHILDREN, PARENTS AND THE COURTS: JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY, UNGOVERNABILITY AND NEGLECT (1972).
Since 1967, a number of studies have been conducted to ascertain the impact of
the Gault decision upon state procedures. See, e.g., Canon & Kolson, Rural Com-
pliance with Gault: Kentucky, A Case Study, 10 J. FAMILY L. 300 (1970); Chused,
The Juvenile Court Process: A Study of Three New Jersey Counties, 26 RUTGERS
L. REV. 488 (1973); Frey, The Effect of the Gault Decision on the Iowa Juvenile
Justice System, 17 DRAKE L. REV. 53 (1976); Gardner, Gault and California, 19
HASTINGS L. REV. 527 (1968); Comment, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 366 (1974); Comment,
Juvenile Court Proceedings Beyond Gault, 32 ALBANY L. REV. 126 (1967); Comment,
The Juvenile Court Revolution in Washington, 44 WASH. L. REV. 421 (1969); Com-
ment, Wisconsin Juvenile Rights After Gault, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1219; Special
Project-Juvenile Justice in Arizona, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1974). None of these
studies has addressed itself to the perceptions of the juvenile offender.
One study has focused upon some of the areas of concern described in this com-
ment. Reflecting a growing interest among social scientists with the stigmatization of
young people during the court process, Snyder studied the impact of the juvenile
court hearing on 43 boys, ranging in age from 10 to 16 years, who had been placed
on probation by the court. Snyder found that the most frequently mentioned feeling
about court appearance was fear, that almost all of the boys remembered that they
had been placed on probation, and that most denied responsibility for their actions.
Snyder, The Impact of the Juvenile Court Hearing on the Child, 17 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 180 (1971). See also R. EMERSON, JUDGING DELINQUENTS (1969).
The stigma that attaches to an adjudication of delinquency, see note 11 infra, has
been formalized under the term "labeling theory" to justify minimal intervention into
the lives of children by means of formal court proceeding:
But, in spite of such general usage, there has been little systematic explication of
the applicability of the theory to the juvenile justice system, and little examination
of its empirical support. It has been described as "our most widely accepted, un-
tested formulation."
Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling Upon Youths in the Juvenile Justice System: A Re-
view of the Evidence, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 583 (1974), quoting Klein, On The Front
End of the Juvenile Justice System, in Los ANGELES REGIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PLANNING BOARD, JUVENILE SYSTEM RATES: DIVERSION App. I, at 7 (1972).
11. See note 8 supra. Recent research in support of the labeling hypothesis indi-
cates that official action for delinquent conduct may stimulate further illegal behavior.
The thrust of the concept is that being identified as a [juvenile delinquent] results
in a "spoiled" public identity. The label results in a degree of public liability
through exclusion from participation in groups and events which would not oc-
cur without the prior attachment of the label. The social liability has the further
effect of reinforcing the deviance.
Orlando & Black, Classification in Juvenile Court: The Delinquent Child and the
Child in Need of Supervision, 25 JUVENILE JUSTICE, May 1974, at 13, 20 citing Foster,
Dinitz, & Reckless, Perceptions of Stigma Following Public Intervention for Delinquent
Behavior, 20 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 202 (1972).
Empirical data is inconclusive, Orlando & Black, supra at 22, but some data sug-
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tally fair" (i.e., guarantees his constitutional rights and treats all of-
fenders equally), he will be more likely to gain a respect for the law
that will lead to his abandoning undesirable behavior in favor of law-
abiding behavior.12
In this study the author compared the attitudes of juvenile of-
fenders toward the juvenile courts in Walla Walla County, a system
which clings to the traditional sociological view to a great extent, 13
gest that rates of recidivism may be higher when there is any kind of official inter-
vention than if nothing is done at all. See, e.g., Gold & Williams, National Study of
the Aftermath of Apprehension, 3 PROSPECTUS 3, 8-9 (1969).
As to the impact of court appearance upon the attitudes of the young offender
toward the legal process, the present study is unique in affording an opportunity for
expression of generalized feelings about the law as well as particularized responses to
a single court hearing and for comparison of the responses in light of the operating
philosophy of the court in which each young person appeared.
Paul D. Lipsitt has conducted an exploratory study of 256 Minnesota boys on the
limited topic of the juvenile's perception of the judge in court. Lipsitt, An Exploratory
Study of Judge-Boy Communications in the Juvenile Court, in NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, NATIONAL JUVENILE COURT JUDGES INSTITUTE AND CONFER-
ENCE PROGRAM (1963); Lipsitt, The Juvenile Offender's Perceptions, 14 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 49 (1968). Youth attitudes toward law and the legal experience have
also been surveyed by Brendan Maher and Ella Stein, see Maher & Stein, The De-
linquent's Perception of the Law and the Community, in CONTROLLING DELINQUENTS
187 (S. Wheeler ed. 1968); Baum & Wheeler, Becoming An Inmate, in id. 153. Both
limited their studies to perceptions of police and judge behavior by boys awaiting
commitment to juvenile institutions. Their findings were restricted to the generation of
psychological data on hostility and the assessment of blame. Wheeler, Cottrell, and
Romasco concluded that "unless appropriate due process of law is followed, even the
juvenile who has violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated and
may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel." Wheeler, Cottrell, &
Romasco, Juvenile Delinquency-Its Prevention and Control, in TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 409, 421 (app. "T").
12. The presumed effects of the juvenile court hearing were expressed by the
United States Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Court
noted that adding the essentials of due process to the proceeding would have an
"impressive" and "therapeutic" effect upon the child in and of itself. Id. at 21-27.
By contrast, the procedural laxness of the parens patriae attitude when accompanied
by a harshly punitive disposition may have an adverse effect upon the child who
feels that he has been deceived or enticed. Id. at 26.
Despite the Court's sanguine review of the sociological literature in Gault, the
Court had little empirical evidence upon which to base its judgment that the con-
stitutional due process method would be more likely to help in the rehabilitation of
the individual than the sociological model. See Lefstein, In the Wake of Gault, in
COURSE ON LAW AND POVERTY: THE MINOR 8.01-.12 (Ohio State Legal Services Ass'n.
ed. 1968). See also notes 10-11 supra.
13. Interview with Roger B. Wilson, Director of the Walla Walla-Columbia Coun-
ties Juvenile Department, in Walla Walla, Washington, Jan. 18, 1972. Stapleton and
Teitelbaum have proposed three variables for determining whether a court is pre-
dominately traditional or legalistic in approach: (1) the type of prosecution; (2) the
form of hearing; (3) the availability of a transcript. W. STAPLETON & L. TEITELBAUM,
IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH 56-58, 107 (1972). Using this criteria, the Walla Walla
County court is almost purely traditional, i.e., prosecution in most instances (other
than fact finding) is by the caseworker, the hearing is informal and conducted in the
judge's chambers, and a transcript is made only on request (unless the hearing is
for adjudicatory purposes). See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
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with the attitudes of offenders toward the system in King County,
which has more fully adopted the constitutional-due process model.' 4
Between the two counties, a total of 31 juveniles were extensively in-
terviewed before and after their juvenile court hearings.' 5 In addition,
nine judges, 14 attorneys, and 19 caseworkers were interviewed in
depth in order to ascertain their philosophies concerning juvenile
corrections. 16
14. For a description of the types of hearings held in King County see 1974
KING COUNTY Juv. DEP'T ANN. REP. See also Part II infra.
15. The method used to obtain data of the type required for a study of the per-
ception of juvenile court proceedings was empirical-both interview and observation
techniques were employed. The general survey was conducted in King and WallaWalla counties over an extended period beginning in 1972 and ending in 1974, and
included interviews with the juveniles both before and after court hearings. In addi-
tion, 101 juveniles were interviewed informally and over 150 hearings were attendedby the author. During the later portions of study, juveniles who had been incarcerated
were also interviewed.
Two-thirds of the sample were alleged delinquents while the remaining one-third
consisted of incorrigible youths. For a definition of terms see note I supra. Of the31 juveniles whose interviews were sufficiently complete so as to be useful for the
analysis, the median age was 16 and 83% had prior contact with juvenile court.
Approximately two-thirds of this sample were Caucasian; slightly more than one-half
were males. Eleven of the 3 1 had been brought to the court as dependent-incorrigibles.
The remainder most frequently were charged with burglary, larceny, and auto theft.
Each interview lasted a minimum of one and one-half hours, pre-hearing and post-
hearing questionnaires combined. The design of the interview schedules was intended
to tap attitudes and expectations about juvenile court, law, and the political authority
system in general. In an effort to substantiate the validity of the juvenile report, in-
dependent observation of the hearings of these juveniles was made by the investigator.
In all cases, a good deal of attention was devoted to procedures of the court, knowl-
edge and understanding of constitutional rights, perceptions of legitimacy in the au-
thority structure, and the varying expectations in court proceedings. Cases were
selected at random in both jurisdictions.
Funding for the study was provided through a graduate research fellowship from
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Grant No. 72-NI-99-1024.
16. The nine judges interviewed included all but one member of the regular ju-
venile court committee in King County, the commissioner (who at the time of the
study was sitting full-time in juvenile court-the position is now rotated among the
three commissioners), the presiding judge (i.e., the Chairman of the Juvenile CourtCommittee), and the judge sitting as juvenile court judge in Walla Walla during the
observation period there. Interviews ranged from 45 minutes to one and one-half
hours in length.
The judicial sample here differed substantially from that represented by earlier
studies. See note 7 infra. See also Smith, A Profile of Juvenile Court Judges in the
United States, 25 JUVENILE JUSTICE, August 1974, at 27, 38 (a follow-up study using
the same questionnaire procedures as in the 1965 study and indicating an increase in
salary and education). The average age in this sample was younger (49) and all were
attorneys. The average time spent in the practice of law (including time as a judge)
was 24 years. Prior to becoming judges, five of the nine were deputy prosecuting
attorneys; one had served as King County Prosecuting Attorney. In their experienceprior to serving as juvenile court judges, most had at least a passing acquaintance
with juvenile proceedings as lawyers (one was a detention worker during his law
school years). The judges spent three months of every two years at juvenile court(somewhat less time than the national survey); those who sat in other departments
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II. THE JUVENILE PROCESS IN THE SURVEYED
COUNTIES
The juvenile court is a unique judicial form not only because of its
philosophy of therapeutic rehabilitation, but also because of the spe-
cial function it performs in building the juvenile's attitude toward au-
thority. In Washington, although the basic procedures of the juvenile
system are outlined by statute and court rule,' 7 much is left to the dis-
cretion of the local authorities. The two counties studied, King
County and Walla Walla County, not only varied in the size and
complexity of their juvenile processes, 18 but varied significantly in
their degrees of acceptance of the traditional sociological model.
of the superior court could expect to be in juvenile court only about 2-4 weeks'in
the same two-year period. In Walla Walla, juvenile court duty was rotated annually
between the two superior court judges in the county.
A total of 14 attorneys were interviewed for periods ranging from one to three
hours. This number included all of the prosecuting attorneys assigned to the King
County Juvenile Court and all of the public defenders. Since there is no public de-
fender staff in Walla Walla, the sample there consisted of the prosecuting attorney
for the county and several private attorneys who had a considerable number of con-
tacts with the juvenile court. The majority of the attorneys interviewed had no more
than three years of experience in the juvenile process. A few indicated that they had
spent some time in non-legal tasks for the court such as volunteer counseling or other
community service projects.
Nineteen caseworkers were interviewed for a period ranging from 45 minutes to
three hours. Throughout the course of the study they were open, friendly, and willing
to cooperate in securing access to staff meetings and in calling attention to useful
sources of information. As with the attorneys, a great deal of insight into the oper-
ational goals and attitudes was provided through informal discussions. Despite the
personal relationships that developed, once the formal interview commenced, there
appeared to be no attempt to conceal "real feelings" or to otherwise adapt responses
to any preconceived notion of what the interviewer might desire to hear. In fact, it is
generally true that there were almost as many opinions of precisely what the re-
searcher's bias might be as there were caseworkers.
The caseworkers in both counties were generally new to the court-most had been
there two years or less and only three had more than six years experience. More
than half of those interviewed, however, indicated some contact with the juvenile
court system prior to the time when they became caseworkers and therefore felt
able to render an opinion on major recent changes in the system.
17. See notes 1-2 supra. See also Part II(A)-(C) infra. See generally Comment,
The Juvenile Court Revolution in Washington, 44 WASH. L. REv. 421 (1969).
18. The juvenile department of the King County Superior Court is composed of
five basic units, four of which are operating divisions staffed primarily by social work
personnel (probation services, investigative services, child care services, and opera-
tional services), with the fifth unit being an administrative component that includes
the offices of the Director and Administrator of Court Services, volunteer coordination,
courtroom management, and training activities. See 1974 KING COUNTY JUV. CT. ANN.
REP. 2-3. See also KING COUNTY Juv. CT. TRAINING MANUAL 3-7 (rev. ed. 1975).
The total organization is the largest in the state and numbers more than 250 staff
members. ANN. REP., supra at 9. A panel of nine superior court judges serves as ajuvenile court committee with one judge sitting as juvenile court for a three-month
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A. The Intake19
Juveniles under the age of 18 may be referred to the juvenile court
by police, school officials, parents, counselors, or by the juveniles
themselves. 2 0 Once the child has been referred to the court, he ap-
period. The chairperson of the juvenile court board of managers (a judge of the
superior court) is available to sit as the caseload requires. In addition, court comis-
sioners serve the court on a regular basis.
By contrast, the juvenile court staff in Walla Walla consists of fewer than six
caseworkers each of whom share in probation counseling and the presentation of
cases in court. The court administrator, a caseworker, shares responsibility for intake
interviews with one other staff member. A single judge serves the court each year.
19. See generally WASH. Juv. CT. R. 2.1-.5 (1968). See also note 21 infra. Precise
figures for the number of delinquent and dependent-incorrigible referrals that are
screened out at intake are unavailable, but individuals interviewed in both King and
Walla Walla counties indicated that the number is in excess of 50% of the total re-
ferred. Interview with Ron Clark, Chief Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Juvenile
Division, King County, in Seattle, Washington, May 14, 1976; telephone interview
with Margaret Wheeler, Assistant Director, Court Services, Walla Walla Juvenile
Court, in Seattle, Washington, May 17, 1976. Nationally the proportion of cases in-
formally adjusted varies widely among jurisdictions. See Ferster & Courtless, The
Intake Process in the Affluent County Juvenile Court, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1127, 1128
(1971). It was reported by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1967
that approximately 52% of the cases referred to juvenile court were disposed of at
intake. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4. at 14.
In deciding whether to screen out the referral by informal adjustment or diversion
to community resources, or to process the case formally through the court, the case-
worker considers the jurisdictional requirements, the attitude of the juvenile, public
interest, previous case history, neighborhood background, and family environment.
See Sheridan, Juvenile Court Intake, 2 J. FAMILY L. 139, 148-54 (1962). There are,
however, no firm standards and few limits on the discretion of the caseworker at this
stage:
The standard by which the intake officer is guided is whether the best interests
of the child and the public will be served by detaining or prosecuting the child.
Such a standard if applied by a court would be held void for vagueness. Its two
criteria present conflicting interests.
L. FORER, "No ONE WILL LISSEN" 77 (1970). But see note 21 infra, detailing the
process of review by the deputy prosecuting attorney in King County. Guidelines for
the intake decision have been devised in the UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 19.
See M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, JUVENILE LAW AND PROCEDURE 126-27 (1974).
A recent study has found that considerations in the referral decision vary widely
and are inconsistent. See, e.g., Williams & Gold, From Delinquent Behavior to Official
Delinquency, 20 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 209 (1972). Statistically significant preditors of
referral are primarily non-legal, i.e., variables bearing on the personal characteristics
and social background of the alleged delinquent, rather than legal factors, i.e., vari-
ables bearing on the nature of the alleged offense. See Thomas & Sieverdes, Juvenile
Court Intake: An Analysis of Discretionary Decision-Making, 12 CRIMINOLOGY 413,
414 (1975).
20. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.060 (1974) provides in pertinent part:
Any person may file with the clerk of the superior court a petition showing that
there is within the county, or residing within the county, a dependent or delin-
quent child and praying that the superior court deal with such child as provided
in this chapter . ...
Under WASH. JUv. CT. R. 2.1 (1968), a petition alleging delinquency must contain
the identification of the child, his parent or custodian, and a statement of the facts
which give the court jurisdiction over the child and over the subject matter of the
proceedings "with reasonable definiteness and particularity." Id. See In re Cleere,
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pears for an intake interview with his parents and an intake officer of
the court.21 Most juveniles are screened out at this stage by informal
13 Wn. App.-611, 536 P.2d 182 (1975) (petition is sufficient for notice requirement
when it is specific and definite enough to fairly apprise juvenile and his parents of
particular acts of alleged misconduct that will be inquired into at adjudicatory hear-
ing). See also In re Jackson, 6 Wn. App. 962, 497 P.2d 259 (1972), where the court
stated:
Children of ordinary understanding know that they must obey their parents or
those persons lawfully standing in a parent's place. Therefore, the phrase "beyond
the control and power of his parents" gives fundamentally fair notice to the
child of a pattern of behavior that might cause him or her to be considered
incorrigible.
Id. at 965, 497 P.2d at 261 (footnote omitted). A child may file an incorrigibility
petition in his own behalf. See In re Snyder, 85 Wn. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975)
(testimony of child admissible for determination of breakdown of parent-child re-
lationship in support of child's own petition of incorrigibility).
A petition may be amended at any time. WASH. Juv. CT. R. 2.1(c) (1968). The
petition or complaint is first referred to the probation officer who will advise the per-
son making the complaint as to whether or not a petition is "reasonably justifiable."
Id. 2.2. Further, the discretion to prosecute under either the statutory section relating
to dependent neglected, WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010(2) (1974), or dependent
incorrigible, id. § 13.04.010(7), is not arbitrary since each requires a different element
of proof. In re Jackson, 6 Wn. App. 962, 497 P.2d 259 (1972).
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.056 (1974). See also WASH. JUV. CT. R. 2.3 (1968).
When a child is in detention, the probation officer is required to interview the child
and to request that the child's parent or guardian be present for the interview. Id.
2.3(b). Where the child is not in detention the probation officer may contact the
child and his parent or interested parties to appear for an intake interview. Id. 2.3(a).
An intake interview is voluntary. Id. 2.3(c).
At the intake interview, the officer is to inform the child and his parents of the
nature of the complaint and, if a petition is to be filed, to present the parties with a
copy of the petition. Upon filing of a petition or admission of a child to detention,
the probation officer must deliver to the child and parent a written statement giving
notice of the right to remain silent, id. 7.1, the right to be represented by counsel and
to have one appointed, id. 7.2, and the right to have a fact-finding hearing on any
allegations in dispute, id. 2.4(3).
See also KING COUNTY Juv. CT. P. & PRAC. H(D) (1976) providing that waiver of
presence of counsel at the intake interview will not be permitted unless the referral
is to be informally adjusted or the child has consulted with counsel about the waiver.
Counsel is to be available during the interview to answer questions about legal
rights, to consult with the juvenile concerning the advisability of waiver of counsel,
and to accept appointment in cases where appointment is to be made. The prosecuting
attorney is not present during the interview. No intake interview is to be held in
King County unless the referral is found to be legally sufficient by the prosecuting
attorney. Cases may, however, be diverted, see notes 67-70 infra, without an intake
interview and without notice to the prosecuting attorney. Under these rules, an intake
interview must be held prior to the 72 hour detention review. The purposes of the
interview are to determine the facts which are to be contested in the petition and to
"discuss the respondent's social situation and possible dispositions of the referral."
KING COUNTY Juv. Cr. P. & PRAC. 11(D) (1976). Where the referral is not informally
adjusted,'see note 22 infra, the probation officer is to set a court hearing date (within
15 days if the child is in detention; within 30 days if the child is not detained). The
petition must be filed within three court days of the interview or denial of a proposed
adjustment. See also State v. Owen, 8 Wn. App. 395, 506 P.2d 900 (1973) (statutory
authorization for participation by the probation officer in the investigation, accusation,
and adjudication process is not an unlawful delegation of executive authority to the
judiciary nor a denial of due process).
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adjustment,22 i.e., the caseworker determines that no formal action by
the court is necessary at that time and will often return the youngster
to his home, perhaps subject to certain conditions. In the case of
felony allegations, a King County deputy prosecuting attorney reviews
the caseworker's decision; 23 no such review occurs in Walla Walla. In
both counties the goal is to handle the greatest number of cases at the
lowest possible administrative level with the least amount of formal
procedure. Although this may mean that many are released after
going through only a few of the preliminary stages of the procedure, it
also means that if those released are required to keep in contact with
the juvenile court system, the influence of the juvenile court is being
extended into individuals' lives without the benefit of a formal pro-
ceeding. 24
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.056 (1974) provides:
Whenever any child is brought to their attention the probation officers in each
county may with the consent of the parent, parents, or legal guardian make
whatever informal adjustment or disposition of the case as is practical without
the filing of a petition ....
See also WASH. Juv. CT. R. 2.5 (1968), permitting the probation officer or a judge
to make an informal adjustment or disposition of any complaint or referral pursuant
to WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.056 (1974).
Statistics indicating the total number of informal adjustments in any given year are
unavailable but caseworkers interviewed in each county stated that the percentage of
misdemeanor adjustments is high. For felony allegations, however, at least in King
County, the number of informal adjustments has been decreasing in recent years,
though no precise numbers are available. Interview with Ron Clark, supra note 19.
Some notion of the frequency with which delinquency complaints are informally
adjusted in King County is provided by comparing the number of delinquency refer-
rals in 1974 (3,304), 1974 KING COUNTY Juv. DEP'T ANN. REP. 24, with the number
of petitions filed (1,723). Interview with Ron Clark, supra note 19. These figures sug-
gest that over half the number of total referrals are subject to formal proceedings.
See also note 13 infra.
Under the new King County rules, see note 21 supra, an informal adjustment may
be proposed by the probation officer where he "believes that formal court interven-
tion would not serve any beneficial purpose for the child or the community." KING
COUNTY JUV. CT. P. & PRAC. II(D) (1976). The prosecuting attorney is to be
"promptly advised" of an informal adjustment proposal. Where the prosecuting at-
torney objects to informal adjustment, a determination is made in chambers by the
judge. A referral may be informally adjusted whether or not the juvenile admits to
the allegations in the complaint so long as he consents to the conditions of the ad-
justment. Id.
23. The system under which the caseworker's decision is reviewed by the prosecut-
ing attorneys to facilitate early screening of serious referrals is called Rapid Referral
and Monitoring (RAM) and was established by the court in April, 1974. King County
Juv. Ct. Admin. Memo. No. 12050 JA (1974-76). It provides for the testing of the
legal sufficiency of a serious complaint (including serious misdemeanors beginning in
the latter part of 1975), diversion of those which are non-petitionable, and adjustment
or filing within twenty days on the remainder. See 1974 KING COUNTY Juv. DEP'T
ANN. REP. 15. In 1975 approximately 5,000 cases were processed through the RAM
system. Interview with Ron Clark, supra note 19.
24. Criticism of the imposition of state control over the lives of juveniles without
benefit of formalized procedures has been widespread. See, e.g., N. KITTRIE, THE
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The caseworker has the 'authority to admit any child to detention2 5
who has been referred to the court, although most youths are not de-
tained.26 A juvenile detained may be held up to 3 days (72 hours) if
no petition has been filed against him. If the youngster requests, he is
entitled to a preliminary detention hearing on the issue of this tempo-
rary detention. 27 At this hearing, the child, his parents, his attorney
RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 153 (1971); E. SHUR, RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION (1973).
The concern is that by labeling the child as a delinquent, or otherwise as a person in
need of "help," society stigmatizes that young person, see note 10 supra, and may in-
flict legal disabilities upon him, see, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)
(sixth amendment requires that criminal defendant be permitted to use witness'
juvenile probationary status for impeachment of a prosecution witness on cross-
examination for bias, state interest in preserving anonymity of juvenile offenders
notwithstanding), without the traditional elements of due process of law. Compare
State v. Matthews, 6 Wn. App. 201, 492 P.2d 1076 (1971) (adult criminal record,
but not juvenile record, may be used to attack the credibility of criminal defendant).
As the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, notes:
The punitive uses of informality are improper and dangerous. Substantial inter-
ference with parental judgment and curtailment of the juvenile's activities must
be preceded by adjudication or the intervention is extra-legal. The well-known
practice of informal probation is vulnerable to attack on this ground; by measur-
ing a juvenile's conduct according to conditions informally laid down by officials
of the State, it constitutes an interference with choices of parents and juveniles
that is legitimate, under our legal traditions, ojily i 'hefi the- basis f6r intervention
has been established in accordance with procedural rules.
Id. at 17.
Non-interventionists suggest that the scope of allowable enforced therapy be nar-
rowed to include only those "serious offenses that cannot simply be defined away
through a greater tolerance of diversity." See E. SCHUR, supra at 23. See also Langley,
The Juvenile Court: The Making of a Delinquent, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 273 (1972).
25. Pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.120 (1974), any child who is taken
into custody and who is not, in the discretion of the caseworker, released to his parent
or guardian may be placed in a detention facility under the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court or into the custody of the probation officer. See WASH. Juv. CT. R. 3.1-2 (1968).
The probation officer is to give immediate notice to the parents or guardian of the
child that he has been placed in detention. Id. 3.3.
There is no special provision setting forth detention criteria. The UNIFORM JUVENILE
COURT ACT § 14 suggests the following standards:
A child taken into custody shall not be detained or placed in shelter care prior
to the hearing on the petition unless his detention or care is required to protect
the person or property of others or of the child or because the child may abscond
or be removed from the jurisdiction of the court or because he has no parent,
guardian, or custodian or other person able to provide supervision and care for
him and return him to the court when required ....
Cited in M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 19, at 115. See generally Jones,
Pre-Hearing Detention of Youthful Offenders: No Place to Go, 1 YALE REV. L. &
SOCIAL ACTION, Spring 197 1, at 28.
26. In 1974, there were 3,304 delinquency referrals and 1,663 admissions to de-
tention classed as delinquent. The average length of stay in detention was 10.3 days.
See 1974 KING COUNTY JUv. DEP'T ANN. REP. 24. In comparison, in 1973 there were
3,428 delinquency referrals to juvenile court and 1,438 admissions to detention. The
average length of stay in detention was 11.0 days. See 1973 KING COUNTY JUV.
DEP'T ANN. REP. 20.
27. WASH. JUV. CT. R. 3.5 (1968) provides that the child and his parents or
guardian must be notified of their right to request a preliminary detention hearing
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(when retained) and the caseworker are present. The judge may ap-
point counsel for the child at this stage if requested.28 In King County,
if the juvenile temporarily detained is not released within 24 hours, a
preliminary detention hearing is normally held within that time.29 In
Walla Walla County, the preliminary detention hearing is commonly
held on the second or third day of detention if the youngster has not
been released by then. 30
The decision to file a petition, 31 the first step in formal proceedings
against the child, or to informally adjust the case is made after investi-
gation by the social work staff and, in King County only, an analysis
where they may be given an opportunity to present evidence and be heard on the
issue of temporary detention. Id. 3.6. If neither the child nor his parents or guardian
requests a preliminary detention hearing, the order for temporary detention may be
signed without hearing. Id. 3.7. The court or probation officer may release a child
from detention at any time. Id. 3.8.
28. Id. 7.2.
29. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.070 (1974). See also id. § 13.04.053. WASH.
Juv. Cr. R. 3.4 (1968) provides that no child shall be held in detention longer than
72 hours unless a petition has been filed, nor may a child be held longer than 72 hours
after a petition has been filed unless a court order has been entered for such con-
tinued detention. In King County an effort is made to move more expeditiously on
the determination as to whether a petition will be filed through the RAM procedure.
See note 23 supra.
30. Interview with Roger Wilson, supra note 13.
31. At the time that a decision is made to file a petition, the caseworker (or the
judge) may determine that retention of jurisdiction over the juvenile by the juvenile
court is "contrary to the best interest of the child or the public" and schedule a de-
cline hearing to consider a decline of jurisdiction. See WAsH. REV. CODE § 13.04.120
(1974). See also WASH. Juv. CT. R. 6.1 (1968). A copy of the petition and notice of
the hearing is to be sent to the child and his parents. Id. 6.2.
Though a decline hearing, see Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), must be
held prior to adjudication of the merits of the petition, see Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519 (1975), it need not "conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or
even of the usual administrative hearing .... " State v. Piche, 74 Wn. 2d 9, 13, 442
P.2d 632, 635 (1968), citing Kent v. United States, supra at 562. See also Sheppard
v. Rhay, 73 Wn. 2d 734, 440 P.2d 422 (1968) (hearsay evidence is admissible in
hearings on transfer ofjurisdiction).
When decline of jurisdiction may result in criminal prosecution for a felony, a
caseworker is required to prepare a decline investigation report including all social
records that are to be made available to the court at the time of the hearing, an
evaluation of the matter, and a recommendation for court action. See WASH. Juv. CT. R.
6.3 (1968). The court may properly consider the seriousness of the offense as a fac-
tor in the determination to decline jurisdiction. See In re Burtts, 12 Wn. App. 564,
530 P.2d 709 (1975) (decline of jurisdiction was not abuse of judicial discretion
where the delinquency petition alleged the murder of mother and stepfather). Other
factors that may be considered include prosecution of adult compatriots in the alleged
offense, the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile, the juvenile's previous record,
the sufficiency of evidence of the alleged offense to be considered by jury in felony
prosecution, prior period of probation or commitment, availability of resources in
the juvenile department, and sufficiency of evidence of the alleged offense for mis-
demeanor prosecution. See Kent v. United States, supra at 566-67. But see In re
Burtts, supra, holding that all eight factors need not be found to justify decline.
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of the legal sufficiency of the charges by a deputy prosecuting at-
torney. 32 In most cases the juvenile is not in custody when the petition
is filed. If a petition is filed while the youth is in custody, he may be
detained for an additional three days, after which a court order is nec-
essary to hold him.33
At the time of the study in King County, after the filing of a peti-
tion, another hearing was held which was similar to an adult arraign-
ment.34 This hearing was held within 72 hours of the filing of the peti-
tion if the child was being detained. Virtually all juveniles who pro-
gressed to the stage of this arraignment-type hearing were represented
either by private counsel or by an attorney from the public defender's
office. At the hearing, or at a prescribed date in the future, the child
was required to respond to the allegations in the petition through an
answer.35 When allegations were denied, an omnibus hearing3 6 was
held to determine which facts were to be contested and which could
be stipulated in order to facilitate the later fact-finding hearing. Nei-
ther the preliminary nor the omnibus hearing was utilized in Walla
Walla. In that county, when an attorney is requested in anticipation of
32. King County rules require that the prosecuting attorney initially determine
the legal sufficiency of any felony or serious misdemeanor complaint, see note 23
supra, and review of informal adjustments, see note 22 supra. See also WASH. REv.
CODE § 13.04.060 (1974) and WASH. Juv. CT. R. 2.2 (1968) (providing that a
complaint is first referred to the probation officer who is responsible for the decision
as to whether a petition will be filed).
33. See WASH. JUV. CT. R. 3.4 (1968); note 29 supra.
34. Under the new court practices and procedures, this pre-trial hearing has
been eliminated. Under KING COUNTY JUV. Cr. P. & PRac. II(D) (1976), the pre-
liminary hearing which was an automatic occurrence during the period of this study
has been replaced by the intake interview. See note 21 supra. KING COUNTY JUV.
CT. P. & PRAC. 11(l) (1976) provides that all motions, including motions to sup-
press evidence, are now to be heard at the time of the fact-finding rather than at
the preliminary hearing unless otherwise scheduled by the court. The state discovery
material will now be made available for inspection by defense counsel prior to or at
the time of the intake interview rather than at the preliminary hearing as with prior
practice. Under id. 1I(H), the respondent is obligated to provide discoverable mate-
rials to the prosecution at least three days before the fact-finding hearing.
35. Pursuant to the new King County rules, the answer hearing has been elim-
inated. The procedure in operation during this study requiring a conference between
the prosecutor and defense counsel prior to the answer hearing for the purpose of
plea bargaining was likewise modified. KING COUNTY Juv. CT. P. & PRAc. II(G) (1976)
provides that hereafter in multi-count petitions, if any count is admitted or found
correct, the case will be noted as noncontested and will proceed immediately to dis-
position.
36. The omnibus hearing, which was introduced in May 1974, has been elimin-
ated by the new King County rules. See KING COUNTY JUV. CT. P. & PRAC. (1976).
See also King County Juvenile Court from the Prosecutor's Perspective 8 March
29, 1976 (unpublished memo on file with the King County Juvenile Court.)
711
Washington Law Review Vol. 51: 697, 1976
a fact finding hearing, the caseworker requests that the judge appoint
a member of the local bar.3 7
B. The Fact-Finding Hearing38
After the petition has been filed, a fact-finding hearing, which con-
sists of a trial on the allegations of fact made in the petition, may be
held. In both counties the youngster is represented by counsel in this
proceeding and a deputy prosecuting attorney presents the case for the
state. The judge must apply the rules of evidence 39 as in adult crim-
inal trials and proof must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.40
The child has the right to remain silent. 41
Of nearly 700 referrals to the juvenile court in Walla Walla during
37. Interview with Roger Wilson, supra note 13.
38. If the allegations of a petition are contested by the child or his parent or
guardian, the court is required to schedule a fact-finding hearing "with reasonable
speed." WASH. Juv. CT. R. 4.1 (1968). Notice and summons are to be served upon
the child including in the notice the time and place of the hearing, specific reference
to the contents of the petition filed, and a statement of the rights to which the child
is entitled under id. 7. Id 4.2 See note 21 supra.
Though the fact-finding is an adversary proceeding under In re Gault, 387 U.S. I
(requiring notice, counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination of witness and the
right to remain silent), adversariness may be jeopardized by the hostility of courts
and commentators to an adversary approach in juvenile court. See Wizner, The
Child and the State: Adversaries in the Junvenile Justice System, 4 COLUM. HUMAN
RIGHTS L. REV. 389, 396 (1972). In both of the Washington counties surveyed,
however, the adversary stance is maintained for the fact-finding hearing with the
prosecutor or his deputy presenting evidence on behalf of the state. See WASH. Juv.
CT. R. 4.4(f) (1968); In re Lewis, 51 Wn. 2d 193, 316 P.2d 907 (1957) (the state
has an interest in the welfare ofjuveniles).
39. WASH. Juv. CT. R. 4.4(a) (1968) provides that the rules of evidence will
be followed in the conduct of the fact-finding hearing, and further, that no social
file or social study will be considered by the court in connection with such hearing.
See In re Cleere, 13 Wn. App. 611, 536 P.2d 182 (1975) (if the findings at the fact-
finding hearing contain some matters of disposition the proceeding will not be pre-
judiced so long as the social file was not considered by the court during the adju-
dication).
The admission of school reports and other hearsay evidence was not unusual in
the hearings observed by the author. Where this admission is challenged on appeal,
however, it is subject to reversal under the rules. See, e.g., In re Baum, 8 Wn. App.
337, 506 P.2d 323 (1973) (admission of social investigation report at adjudicatory
hearing voids hearing).
40. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See also WASH. Juv. CT. R. 4.4(b)
(1968) which requires that in a fact-finding hearing on a petition alleging delin-
quency, the facts alleged must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
41. WASH. JUv. CT. R. 7.1 (1968) specifically guarantees the right to remain silent
to each juvenile. Under id. 2.4 notice of this right is given at the time the youth is
referred to the court. In King County, the process has been formalized to such an
extent that a mimeographed copy of the rights to which he is entitled under the
United States Constitution and the statutes of the State of Washington is presented
to each juvenile when he arrives at court for the intake intetview or when he
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each of the three years of the study, only approximately 200 per year
were subject to formal proceedings; of these 200, only four progressed
to the fact finding stage annually. 42 In King County, by contrast, ap-
proximately 4,000 delinquency and dependent-incorrigible referrals
were made during each of the same three years and slightly less than
half were treated to some formal proceeding at court; nearly 800
annually participated in fact-finding hearings.43
C. The Disposition"
1. The disposition hearing
If in the fact-finding hearing a child is found to have committed the
acts alleged in the petition, a disposition hearing generally is held
appears for detention. In Walla Walla, rights are generally given verbally at the first
contact with the caseworker.
The Supreme Court recently has recognized the critical nature of the right to remain
silent in the context ofjuvenile proceedings. In Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), re-
flecting on the potential for transfer to adult criminal court following adjuciatory proceed-
ings in juvenile court, the Court considered the child's dilemma:
[A] juvenile, thought to be the beneficiary of special consideration, may in fact
suffer substantial disadvantages. If he appears uncooperative, he runs the risk of
an adverse adjudication, as well as of an unfavorable dispositional recommen-
dation. If, on the other hand, he is cooperative, he runs the risk of prejudicing
his chances in adult court if transfer is ordered.
Id. at 1791 (footnote omitted).
42. Interview with Roger Wilson, supra note 13.
43. See 1974 KING COUNTY Juv. DEP'T ANN. REP.; 1972 KING COUNTY Juv. DEP'T
ANN. REP.
44. See generally WASH. JUV. CT. R. 5.1-.4 (1968). The social study forms the
basis for individualized treatment and is prepared by the caseworker for the court
in consideration of the total behavioral pattern of the juvenile rather than upon the
specific conduct emanating in the current charge. See M. PAULSEN & C. WHITEBREAD,
supra note 19, at 169-72. According to a recent study in Washington, D.C., the pro-
bation officers were more successful in achieving acceptance of their recommenda-
tions than were defense attorneys. Susman, Juvenile Justice: Even-Handed or Many-
Handed?, 19 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 493, 506 (1973). In Washington, WASH. Juv.
CT. R. 5.3(b) (1968) provides that the judge is to consider evidence presented at
the hearing together with the social file and social study before preparing his written
findings of fact and conclusions of law in connection with an order of disposition.
See id. 5.3(c).
That the court, at a disposition hearing, can and should be able to consider all
the evidence it deems pertinent was recently reiterated in Monroe v. Tielsch, 84 Wn.
2d 217, 525 P.2d 250 (1974), as follows:
In short, the judge, facing one of the most difficult tasks in the judicial system,
needs all the help and information possible to reach a decision as to how to best
correct and aid the juvenile before him. Obviously that decision may be a lit-
eral turning point in the young offender's life.
Id. at 219, 525 P.2d at 251. See also WASH. Juv. CT. R. 4.4(a) (1968) (specifically
providing that no social file or social study shall be considered by the court in
connection with the fact-finding hearing).
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within 30 days of the finding.45 Such a hearing must be held whenever
a court order is required for corrective treatment.46 Prior to the hear-
ing, the caseworker evaluates social and family factors relating to the
child and submits a written report to the court containing alternative
recommendations. 47
Prior to the United States Supreme Court decisions In re Gault48
and Kent v. United States,49 the findings of the social worker-proba-
tion officer were usually accepted by the juvenile court without chal-
lenge.50 In Kent, the Court required an evidentiary hearing and find-
45. See KING COUNIY Juv. CT. R. Il(B)(1)(f) (1974); 1974 KING COUNTY JUv.
DEP'T ANN. REP. 16. The state juvenile court rules contain no time limit during
which the dispositional hearing must be held. WASH. Juv. CT. R. 5.3(d) (1968)
specifically allows the court to "enter an order which defers the entry of any findings
of fact" whenever the child and his parent or guardian agree and whenever "such
deferral is in the best interests of the child." Id. With these deferred findings, the
judge may also enter an agreed order of disposition, or the court may defer entry
of any order of disposition subject to conditions set by the court. When the condi-
tions are met, the court may later dismiss the petition.
46. Whenever a juvenile is found to be delinquent or dependent, see note I supra,
the court must "make such order for the care, custody, or commitment of the child
as the child's welfare in the interest of the state requires." WASH. REV. COoE § 13.-
04.095 (1974). See also WASH. JUv. CT. R. 5.4(a) (1968) which provides that a pe-
tition may be scheduled for a combined fact-finding and disposition hearing where
the caseworker determines that an intake interview, preliminary investigation or
social study is inappropriate. It is unclear whether this abbreviated procedure would
be permissible under the new King County rules. See note 21 supra.
Any order made by the court in the case of a dependent or delinquent child may
at any time be changed or modified in the discretion of the judge. WASH. REV. COoE §
13.04.150 (1974). The statutory authority forms the basis for juvenile modification
procedures in King County. Thus, whenever a legally sufficient referral for delin-
quency is made, or the caseworker believes that a modification of the court's order
requiring care, custody, or commitment should be considered, or when there is
reason to believe that there has been a violation of the court's order and the court
has previously established jurisdiction based upon delinquency or incorrigibility a
modification hearing may be held. KING COUNTY Juv. CT. P. & PRAC. I(A) (1975).
The hearing date must be set within two weeks of the receipt of referral or within
a reasonable time after the caseworker has received knowledge of another reason for
the hearing. Id. I(D). Discovery is available. Id. I(G). At the hearing, the case-
worker or prosecuting attorney summarizes the facts regarding the alleged delin-
quent act or other reason for review, presents evidence and examines witnesses when
appropriate: both the caseworker and the prosecuting attorney make recommenda-
tions. Id. I(H)(1)-(4). Any evidence which is admissible at an adult probation
revocation hearing may be considered as evidence in the modification hearing. See,
e.g., Monohan v. Burdman, 84 Wn. 2d 922, 530 P.2d 334 (1975) (petitioner en-
titled to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and to present evidence
in his own behalf in probation revocation hearing). The judge may revoke proba-
tion or otherwise modify the prior court order if he is reasonably satisfied that the
terms of probation were violated: the burden of proof is a preponderance of the
evidence. KING COUNTY JUv. CT. P. & PRAC. I(H)(4) (1975).
47. See WASH. Juv. CT. R. 5.2 (1968). See also note 44 supra.
48. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
49. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). See note 31 supra.
50. See generally Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, in TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 4.
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ings of fact prior to the transfer of jurisdiction from juvenile to adult
court.51 The Court in In re Gault further required that the juvenile
who is charged with offenses for which he risks loss of liberty must be
entitled to a fact-finding hearing where he has the rights to have
counsel (appointed where necessary), cross-examine and confront
adverse witnesses, and to remain silent.52
One of the most significant impacts of the Gault decision on the
juvenile courts has been the shifting of emphasis away from the social
investigation report as a probative force in the fact-finding hearing. In
the traditional court the social report was considered to be a necessary
concomitant of individualized justice.53 The controversy surrounding
its use was primarily concerned with the influence which it had upon
the judge's decisions. Its almost uncritical acceptance by the judge
gave it a weight seemingly not anticipated by legislative guidelines. 54 -
This rather blind acceptance of the social file was also contrary to the
desired procedural regularity of the court which required an objective,
albeit sympathetic, determination of the best interest of the child.
Today, however, the social report and attendant recommendations
are not considered at the fact-finding stage but are considered by the
judge at the disposition stage of the proceedings. 55 In King County the
child is represented by counsel at the dispositional hearing and the
information on which the social report is based as well as the recom-
51. 383 U.S. at 557.
52. 387 U.S. at 41, 56-57.
53. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. Controversy concerning the use
of the social report was primarily centered around its potential influence upon thejudge's decisions and what were seen as defects in its evidentiary basis. Yet even
though the juvenile's attorney is now permitted to review the social study prior to
disposition, see note 56 infra, outright attacks upon its validity are still the exception.
The public defenders and private attorneys who represent juveniles find it tactically
more advantageous to work with the social worker during the preparation of the
recommendation in an attempt to secure a favorable outcome by persuasion and
negotiation. The prosecuting attorney in King County is taking an increasngly active
role in the disposition process. Interview with Ron Clark, supra note 19.
54. WASH. Joy. CT. R. 5.2 (1968) provides that a social study consisting of in-
vestigation and evaluation is to be completed by the probation department of the
juvenile court for presentation to the judge at the disposition hearing together with
all social records. Id. 5.3(b) states simply "[T] he court shall consider the social file
and social study in addition to evidence produced at the hearing." See text accom-
panying notes 44-45 supra. WASH. Juv. CT. R. 5.2(b) (1968) gives counsel access
to the report. This has been translated with varying degrees of cooperation: in King
County the attorney for the juvenile is regularly given a copy prior to the disposi-
tional hearing; in Walla Walla, the privilege is limited to inspection of the report.
55. See note 54 supra.
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mendation itself may be subject to scrutiny 56 including, but not lim-
ited to, cross examination of the person who prepared the report. In
Walla Walla an attorney rarely appears at the disposition hearing5 7
and the report is presented by the caseworker in chambers with the
judge, the child, and the child's parents present.
When a child has been found to be delinquent or incorrigible the
statute provides a number of alternative dispositions depending upon
the individual needs of that child.58 There is no mandatory maximum
or minimum period during which the juvenile court is to assert control
by reason of the particular conduct. The court cannot, however, su-
pervise the correction of an individual after he or she reaches age 18.59
Some juveniles may first be sent to the Cascadia Diagnostic Center
in order to obtain a recommendation as to their proper disposition.6"
Others may be immediately placed on probation 1 in the care of par-
ents under the supervision of a court caseworker until such time as
there has been a demonstrable change in the behavior which resulted
in their appearance before the court.62 Alternatively, the youngster
56. WASH. Juv. CT. R. 5.2(b) (1968) provides that an attorney for any inter-
ested party shall have the right to inspect the social file and social study at a "rea-
sonable time prior to the disposition hearing, unless the court in a particular case
decides that release of certain information would be detrimental to the best inter-
ests of the child."
57. Interview with Roger Wilson, supra note 13.
58. The child may be ordered to remain in the care of his parents or guardian
while under the supervision of a probation officer; he may be placed in the custody
of a probation officer; he may be placed in the care of a "'reputable citizen or asso-
ciation" or an "appropriate private agency;" or he may be committed to the De-
partment of Institutions (now Department of Social and Health Services). WASH.
REV. CODE § 13.04.095 (1974). Effective July 1, 1977, juveniles who are found to
be dependent-incorrigibles will no longer be committed to the Department of In-
stitutions beyond a 30-day temporary diagnostic commitment where it is proven
before a judge that the child's behavior is likely to lead into criminal acts and there
is a good possibility that he can be successfully treated. Ch. 71, § 2(5), [1976] Wash.
Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. 221. It has been predicted that 300 children now institutional-
ized will be released by July 1, 1977. See Jones, New Law to Free 300 Youths Now
in State Custody, Seattle Times, May 8, 1976, § A, at 2, col. 5-6.
59. In re Carson, 84Wn. 2d 969,530 P.2d 331(1975).
60. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.190 (1974). See also note 58 supra.
61. See note 58 and accompanying text supra. Despite the variety of proba-
tionary services provided by the counties in the State of Washington, it has been held
that evidence of disparities in the per capita amount spent on probation in one
county as compared to another is an insufficient basis for a finding that a lower per
capita amount will result in the denial of a juvenile's right to the same probationary
services as residents of counties with a higher per capita amount enjoy. State v.
Owen, 8 Wn. App. 395, 396-97, 506 P.2d 900, 901 (1973). See also WASH. REV.
CODE § 13.06.010 et seq. providing, as an alternative to commitment, special super-
vised probation programs jointly funded by the state and by the county.
62. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
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may be placed with a private agency within the community. The ulti-
mate sanction which may be imposed is commitment to the Depart-
ment of Social and Health Services. 63 Having fewer community re-
sources available short of incarceration, the commitment alternative is
more frequently used in Walla Walla County than in King County.64
2. Alternatives to formal disposition
In instances in which no petition has been filed, and therefore no
formal court hearing occurs, there are still sanctions that may be im-
posed on the juvenile offender. In Walla Walla County, the sanction is
determined by the caseworker who may set an informal probationary
period during which the youngster is under a certain amount of super-
vision by the caseworker and during which the juvenile may be liable
for periods of detention. 65 In King County there are two additional
methods of determining the informal disposition of juvenile offend-
ers.66 The disposition of juveniles who are classified as incorrigible or
who commit offenses classified as "juvenile offenses,167 may be han-
63. See WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.095 (1974).
64. There is some indication that the commitment alternative is now being used
with greater frequency in King County. At the time of the study, the average com-
mitments per year from King County numbered 75 whereas in 1975 that number
increased to 218. Interview with Ron Clark, supra note 19. Recent data from
Walla Walla is unavailable.
65. Interview with Roger Wilson, supra note 13.
66. King County juvenile court has developed guidelines for the diversion of
delinquency referrals to community resources or to parents. Referrals may be diverted
without an intake interview and without notice to the prosecuting attorney if the
referral is classified as: (1) a misdemeanant referral (except assault and carrying a
concealed weapon) and there is no indication that the juvenile referred has a nega-
tive attitude, there has been no prior juvenile court felony referral within the pre-
ceding 12-month period, and there has been no juvenile court misdemeanor referral
within the past 6 months; (2) a felony referral where the crime is against property
in an amount less than $250.00, or where the crime involves violation of the Uni-
form Controlled Substances Act and the amount is small (and no indication that
the juvenile has been selling the drugs), or where the felony is a single offense, or
a first felony referral to the court, or there has not been any misdemeanor or de-
pendency referral to the court for 12 months, and there is a court-approved com-
munity resource available to take the referral.
In the case of diversion of a felony referral, the community resource is required
to report to the court concerning the successful completion of restitution or re-
habilitation. If the community resource has been unsuccessful in completing a
restitution or rehabilitation program, the felony referral is to be returned to the
court. See KING COUNTY JUV. CT. P. & PRAC., GUIDELINES FOR DIVERSION OF DELIN-
QUENCY REFERRALS TO COMMUNITY RESOURCES OR PARENTS (1976).
67. See 1972 KING COUNTY JUv. DEP'T ANN. REP. 22. Juvenile offenses include
those which would not be considered a crime if they were committed by an adult,
e.g., curfew violations, truancy, liquor consumption, and the status of being beyond
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dled by a Juvenile Court Conference Committee. The committees,68
the members of which are trained volunteers, recommend courses of
action to the juvenile and his family, but may not enforce their sugges-
tion. Some form of counseling is usually recommended. The disposi-
tion of juveniles who are involved in more serious delinquencies may
be determined by one of the Youth Service Bureaus. 69 Unlike the con-
ference committees, the bureaus maintain permanent facilities. The
boards serving these bureaus are made up of members of the commu-
nity in which the bureau is located and of which the juvenile is a resi-
dent. The usual form of discipline suggested by the Youth Service
Bureau board is a planned program of restitution. If the juvenile is not
the control of a parent or guardian. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010
(1974).
68. Juvenile court conferences committees in King County began in 1963 to
handle minor juvenile problems within various communities throughout the county.
See 1972 KING COUNTY Juv. DEP'T ANN. REP. 21-24. Their number has been stead-
ily increasing since that time. See 1974 KING COUNTY Juv. DEP'T ANN. REP. 14. In
1974, the last year for which figures are available, 2,068 juvenile referrals were
diverted for conference committee action; in 1973, the number referred to such
committees was only 983. Id. at 24.
69. The Youth Service Bureau concept for diversion of juveniles from the juve-
nile court process has gained widespread acceptance as a desirable alternative to the
formalized procedures of court intervention. See, e.g., L. EMPEY, Juvenile Justice
Reform: Diversion, Due Process and Deinstitutionalization, in PRISONERS IN AMERICA
13 (L. Ohlin ed. 1973); Q. Steinberg, Reorganization of the Juvenile Court, 1971
(unpublished report on file in King County Juvenile Court). The current trend stems
primarily from the recommendations made in the report of the PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). The Commission recommended:
Communities should establish neighborhood youth-serving agencies--Youth
Services Bureaus-located if possible in comprehensive neighborhood commu-
nity centers and receiving juveniles (delinquent and nondelinquent) referred
by the police, the juvenile court, parents, schools, and other sources. These
agencies would act as central coordinators of all community services for young
people and would also provide services lacking in the community or neigh-
borhood, especially ones designed for less seriously delinquent juveniles.
Id. at 83.
The King County Youth Service Bureau consists of nine agencies located through-
out the county: Federal Way, Bothell, Highline, Auburn, Kent, Mercer Island, Ren-
ton, Bellevue, and Shoreline. Several other bureaus are located within the Seattle-
Metropolitan area. See DEP'T OF COMMUNITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEVELOPMENT.
DIVISION OF YOUTH AFFAIRS KING COUNTY YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU SYSTEM SEVEN
MONTH EVALUATION AUGUST 1974-FEBRUARY 1975 (1975).
For a description of the training provided to community bureau members see
Statsky, The Training of Community Judges: Rehabilitative Adjudication, 4 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 401 (1972). A somewhat less enthusiastic view of the youth
service bureau phenomenon is prsented in Cole, Diversion and the Juvenile Court:
Competition or Cooperation, 27 JUVENILE JUSTICE, February 1976 at 33. The im-
pact is great, however, as courts come to place increasing reliance on such diver-
sionary mediums. For example, in 1973, no referrals were made to a youth service
bureau but in 1974, 152 such referrals were made. See 1974 KING COUNTY JUV.
DEP'T ANN. REP. 24.
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willing to cooperate with either the Juvenile Court Conference Com-
mittee or the Youth Service Bureau, a petition may be filed against
him when he is returned to juvenile court for formal proceedings.7 0
III. ATTITUDES OF JUDGES, CASEWORKERS, AND
ATTORNEYS: THE ASSUMPTION -OF A
THERAPEUTIC COURT PROCESS
A. The Judges7'
In both counties, the data collected indicate that the judges viewed
the juvenile court process as one which is primarily therapeutic rather
than one in which the goal is the fair and impartial administration of
justice. Thus, the jurists have, for the most part, accepted the tradi-
tional sociological perspective toward juvenile corrections.72
70. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
71. There has been little empirical verification of the speculations concerning
the philosophy and attitude formation attendant on the role of the juvenile courtjudge. Perhaps the major attempt of this kind was made in 1963 by Shirely McCune
and Daniel Skoler for the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges (NCJCJ).
See McCune & Skoler, Juvenile Court Judges in the United States-Part I: A Na-
tional Profile, 11 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 121 (1965). Of the 3,000 judges sent mail
questionnaires, 1,560 responded (no state was represented by less than 23% of the
total judicial population, most had 50% or more responding): 96% were male, the
average age was 53 years; the average salary was $12,493,15. Nearly 75% had been
elected to office, one third of them after an initial interim appointment; 62% had
previously been elected to another public office. Among those judges serving full-
time, 72% spent a quarter or less of their time on juvenile matters. The authors
surmised that population size was a key variable with respect to types and extent
of court services as was the judge's professional education, experience, and remun-
eration. They concluded: "What emerges is a picture of the judge group having
more family marital stability, more experience in the parental role, and more com-
mitment to societal and middle class norms than the country as a whole
Id. at 123.
In a related follow-up study for the NCJCJ, Walther & McCune, Judges Compared
With Other Court System Personnel, 17 JUVENILE CT. JUDGES J. 74 (1966), 292
judges were given the Job Analysis and Interest Measurement (JAIM) test in an effort
to identify common orientations and to describe some point of potential conflict in
work styles within the juvenile court system--given the assumption that work styles
and values influence performance. When compared with attorneys and caseworkers,
it was determined that the major differences among the professions arose in their
attitudes toward authority and their methods for inducing desirable behavior from
those with whom they work: the judges were more likely to adhere to moral prin-
ciples which they regarded as absolute, to identify with authority, and to motivate
by participative leadership. Lawyers generally accepted the concept of relative
morality, tended to be independent and autonomous, and preferred to motivate others
either by directive leadership or through threat of punishment. The caseworkers
shared the views of the lawyers with the exception, that motivation for behavior
was best induced by showing people the consequences of their actions.
72. Six of the nine judges felt that the hearing contributed to rehabilitation of
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Most judges surveyed felt that the prevention function of the juve-
nile court is fundamental and that therefore undesirable behavior
should be dealt with by the juvenile correctional system, even though
no specific offense has been committed, in order to "impress" the child
with the consequences of aberrant behavior. 73 The interviewed judges
therefore saw their main purpose as one of helping the child overcome
his problems, with the judge's duty to protect the legal rights of the
juveniles as secondary. The judges felt their least important duty was
to protect society and deter other juveniles from misbehavior.74
the young offender; two indicated that it might contribute to rehabilitation depend-
ing on the judge who conducts the hearing. Only one judge felt that the effects of
the hearing were minimal. This is in sharp contrast to the conclusions of a Califor-
nia study:
Based upon estimates furnished by juvenile court judges, the average time
spent on a juvenile court case is approximately 10 to 15 minutes . . . . An
appropriate question is whether the beneficent values of the juvenile court hear-
ing implied by the philosophy expressed in the law can be achieved in the abbre-
viated time which most juvenile courts devote to each case. To what extent, for
example, can a judge make a significant impact on the errant child and his pa-
rents in what is almost an assembly line judicial process?...
CAL. Gov.'s SPECIAL STUDY COMM'N ON Juv. JUSTICE A STUDY OF THE ADMIN. OF Juv.
JUSTICE IN CALIF. pt. 2, at 16 (1960), cited in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
Another commentary has described the hearing in terms of a "ceremony"-"a vir-
tual trial of moral character"--the objective of which is to impose such a degree of
humiliation upon the juvenile that his delinquent behavior will be curtailed R. EMER-
SON. JUDGING DELINQUENTS 214-15 (1969). But then, as one judge in King County
candidly stated: "The kids of the county are the kids of the juvenile court judge,
and he does what he wants to with them and nobody messes with it." Confidential
interview with a King County juvenile court judge, in Seattle, Washington, Sept.
1973.
One of the respondents who did not share this view remarked:
Theoretically. the earlier identification of anti-social behavior, the greater chance
for success, but if we are to preserve a free society, there need to be restraints.
"Big brother" must not move in too rapidly. Courts must not permit social workers
to take over since the latter do not have the same concepts and training in the
preservation of rights in a free society.
Confidential interview with a King County juvenile court judge, in Seattle, Washing-
ton, Dec. 1973.
73. Six of the judges supported the proposition that early intervention into the
lives of young people was necessary even before a specific offense is committed. Cer-
tain statuses require attention or treatment, as four of the judges explained, for the
welfare of the child and of the community. See also note 24 supra.
74. Only two of the judges mentioned the protection of society as a primary func-
tion of juvenile court. By contrast, six of the judges indicated that the predominant
task of the court was to provide services to the juvenile with adjustment problems
that he can not secure from his home, his associates, or other agencies. A representa-
tive commentary regarding the goal of juvenile court is provided by the following
response from a judge in King County: "Juvenile court should effect the rehabilita-
tion or reorientation of children whose conduct raises likelihood of inability to con-
form their conduct to the minimal regulations of society." Confidential interview
with a King County juvenile court judge, in Seattle, Washington, Apr. 1973.
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Despite the fact that most judges cling to the sociological approach
to juvenile corrections, they characterized their hearings as formal.75
They believed that the hearing itself contributes to the rehabilitation
of the youth by reinforcing parental authority and by making the indi-
vidual accept the responsibility for his actions.76 Punishment, con-
sidered by the judges to be an integral part of the rehabilitation pro-
cess, was also felt to be helpful in making a youngster accept responsi-
bility for his own actions. 77
B. The Caseworkers7 8
The overwhelming number of caseworkers felt that the hearing has
therapeutic value.79 Despite reservations about the utility of a more
75. Seven of the nine judges characterized their hearings as "formal" although
one of this number expressed unhappiness with that characterization. Only two judges
stated that their hearings were informal with "no strict rules of decorum or lan-
guage." Confidential interviews with King County juvenile court judges, in Seattle,
Washington, Mar. 1973.
76. The importance of insuring that the juvenile accepts the seriousness of the
offense that has brought him to juvenile court was evident from the comments of at
least five of the judges. As one respondent put it:
[C] ause I'm a do-gooder I think we should give treatment early. In certain cir-
cumstances, the criminal justice area needs to do good before someone commits
a specific offense. It's harmful when kids go through the system and nothing is
done. "Acting out" evidences other problems which must be acted upon by a
governmental body when it comes to its attention.
Confidential interview with a King County juvenile court judge, in Seattle, Washing-
ton, Sept. 1973.
77. Six of the nine judges viewed punishment as a legitimate and even necessary
tool of the rehabilitative process. One thought that punishment was statutorily pro-
hibited. Another felt that treatment was the only legitimate function of the juvenile
court process. The final respondent, amazingly, indicated that he could not advance an
opinion as to the utility of punishment because he "didn't know anything about kids."
For an interesting discussion of the withdrawal from the treatment philosophy in
juvenile court see Fox, The Reform of Juvenile Justice: The Child's Right to Punish-
ment, 25 JUVENILE JUSTICE, August 1974, at 2.
78. For a discussion of the conflicts faced by the social worker in juvenile court
after the Gault decision see Clayton, The Relation of the Probation Officer and the
Defense Attorney After Gault, 34 FED. PROBATION, March, 1970, at 8; Schultz, The
Adversary Process, the Juvenile Court and the Social Worker, 36 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV.
288 (1968). As expressed by one judge in King County, commenting on the profes-
sional antagonisms arising from the introduction of legal formalities into the juve-
nile court setting: 'There are too many lawyers who hate social workers; too many
social workers who are afraid of lawyers; and too many judges who can't stand
either." Confidential interview with a King County juvenile court judge, in Seattle,
Washington, Jan. 1974.
79. Thirteen of the nineteen caseworkers interviewed found the hearing to be
therapeutic by "making the kid stop and think what happened and why, to take
responsibility for his actions." Depending upon the child and his relative level of
sophistication, nine of the caseworkers noted, a lecture from the judge may serve
"to frighten a sense of respect for authority into the child."
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formal system, many felt that the hearing itself could have beneficial
impact upon the juvenile by creating in him respect for the process, by
causing him to accept the seriousness of his problems, and even by
"scaring" him into modification of his antisocial behavior. 80 A number
of respondents, however, consistent with their overall apprehension
about the impact of attorneys in the system, felt that the hearing only
served to increase the child's ability to manipulate the system without
rehabilitation. 81
Although most of the social workers said that they approved of the
Gault decision generally, they specifically criticized its effects both on
the juvenile court system and on the juveniles themselves. Most disap-
proved of the "legalities" required by Gault which resulted in the in-
creased participation of attorneys and in a slower and less flexible
process.82 The effect of the legalistic proceedings on juveniles was
generally regarded as being even more deleterious. It was felt that the
juvenile under the Gault system is more apt to adopt the arrogant
stance of his attorney, i.e., he will refuse to talk, will be "less respon-
sive to law enforcement authority" and will engage in sophisticated
efforts to manipulate the system in an attempt to "beat the rap."
Therefore the caseworkers felt that Gault and its progeny resulted in
the juvenile offender's lack of a sense of responsibility or account-
ability for his behavior. Further, it was felt that without this element of
acceptance of responsibility, the rehabilitation of the juvenile is im-
possible.83 A few juveniles, it was conceded, might feel a positive ef-
fect from Gault by having their say in the system, but most of these
juveniles knew their rights anyway, the caseworkers surmised.
80. See note 79 supra. One caseworker, however, felt that threats were of little
utility, stating: "Fear is rarely a promoter of constructive efforts and motivation."
81. Five caseworkers noted that many of the youths who had experienced a num-
ber of contacts with juvenile court were likely to regard the hearing as a 'joke" or a
"game," the object of which was to "manipulate the case-worker before he manipu-
lates you." These same respondents felt that the parents' attitude was the critical
factor influencing the perceptions of the juvenile regarding the hearing.
82. Thirteen of the nineteen caseworkers displayed a lack of enthusiasm for the
Gault formalities. As one caseworker from King County noted:
The routine assignment of a public defender is generally good. but the attorney
locks us into certain kinds of procedures . . . it's much less flexible. You can't
put a kid on probation anymore without a fact-finding.
In Walla Walla. much the same opinion was expressed:
There are cases where Gault kids have gotten [sic] attorneys, were acquitted
and were not afforded proper care. We must use discretion in its implementa-
tion but its not too much of a problem here.
83. These selected comments are indicative of this general attitude: "Attorneys
will deny the charges even though the kid admits to the police-a bad attitude de-
velops." "Multiple offenders learn to beat the rap-to manipulate the system." Most
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C. The Attorneys84
In contrast to the perception of the social workers, and to a more
limited extent, of the judges, that the attorney brings an adversary
stance to the juvenile court hearing, the attorneys themselves saw an
additional function for themselves apart from advocacy. Although vir-
tually all of the attorneys characterized themselves as advocates, more
than half added to their tasks a sociological element which dictated the
necessity to educate the youngsters and their parents about the system
and to investigate the child's family predicament before rendering legal
advice.85 The extent to which the traditional "best-interests-of-the-
child" philosophy is accepted as a concomitant of the attorney-client
relationship is apparent from the responses of the attorney sample.
86
This factor does not vary significantly among private attorneys, public
defenders, and deputy prosecuting attorneys.
Interestingly, there appears to be a sense in which the attorney eval-
uates his role in juvenile court from a personal rather than a profes-
of the caseworkers, however, felt confident of their own role authority so that the
potential for reformed behavior may exist in spite of Gault:
[T] he kids are learning to manipulate the system (although not all understand it)
but it's not a real hazard. Kids still feel that the caseworker carries a lot of
weight. (Recites example of a boy picked up by the police for failure to attend
a meeting with his caseworker.) If you try to be straight with the kids, no pro-
blems.
Confidential interview with King County caseworker, in Seattle, Washington, Apr.
1973.
84. The subject of the lawyer's role in juvenile court has received much attention
in recent years. See, e.g., Erickson, The Defence Lawyer's Role in Juvenile Court: An
Empirical Investigation into Judges' and Socialworkers' Points of View, 24 U. TORONTO
LJ. 126 (1974); Ferster & Courtless, Pre-Dispositional Data, Role. of Counsel and
Decisions in a Juvenile Court, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 195 (1972); Kay & Segal, The
Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-Polar Approach, 61
GEo. LJ. 1401 (1973); Platt, Schecter & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case of
the Public Defender in Juvenile Court, 43 IND. LJ. 619 (1968); Wizner, The De-
fense Counsel: "Neither Father, Judge, Probation Officer or Social Worker," 7 TRIAL,
Sept.-Oct. 1971, at 30.
85. As one attorney noted:
A juvenile court proceeding is a family matter. You must understand the
family situation to represent, i.e., get the picture of how kids reason. You can't
take what the kids say at face value. An attorney needs to be more than a hired
gun though he does not necessarily have to do what the parents want.
Confidential interview with a private attorney, in Seattle, Washington, May 1973.
86. Six of the attorneys mentioned functions that they felt would be appropriate
for them to perform for a juvenile client, but not if the client were an adult. Three
talked of describing and explaining the system; two referred to counseling to make
the juvenile a better citizen. Another spoke of showing an interest in the child. Of the
remaining respondents (eight in number) who saw themselves in an adversary role,
only four were willing to characterize their function as "merely a mouthpiece for the
child." The others qualified the advocacy stance with a view that the child's welfare
must be as important as providing a "purely legal defense."
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sional standpoint. Where a conflict between the parens patriae con-
cept and the adversary tradition arises, an attorney, particularly one
with children of his own, will reach from his own experience in order
to determine the manner in which he will react to his young client.
8 7
Although the deputy prosecuting attorney was very willing to aid
the caseworker, most of the deputies detected a hostility on the part of
the caseworkers who see the prosecutors as interfering with the coun-
selling relationship and as taking over the functions of filing petitions
and adjusting cases at intake. 88 It was noted by a few of the deputies,
however, that at least some caseworkers are grateful to be relieved of
the prosecution responsibility. Only a few of the attorney respondents
(all private counsel) described the caseworkers as cooperative. 89 This
may be a result of the fact that appointed private counsel generally
appear in instances in which the issue is whether the child is depen-
dent. When the issue is dependency the caseworker's position is less
likely to be in conflict with that of the attorney who is appearing as
guardian ad litem.9 0
IV. THE YOUNG OFFENDER'S PERCEPTION OF THE
JUVENILE COURT SYSTEM
A. Pre-Hearing Expectations"
Although the majority of the sample had been in juvenile court pre-
87. This view was illustrated by one private attorney who concluded:
An attorney can help in certain instances but I disagree that the attorney should
primarily protect rights-that's doing away with the juvenile system then. The
legislature felt that juveniles were special and not to be treated as adults, so with
that principle, the juvenile should not worry about rights. I don't need an attor-
ney to discipline my kid.
Confidential interview with a private attorney, in Walla Walla. Washington. Feb. 1972.
88. Three of the four King County deputies stated that many of the caseworkers
in their court either did not understand or refused to understand the deputies' rela-
tionship to the legal process nor did they accept the prosecutor's role in it.
89. Of the seven private attorneys interviewed, four found the caseworkers to be
generally cooperative and helpful in explaining the system to them.
90. See also LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF WASHINGTON, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN
WASHINGTON STATE 9-13 (1975). The study conducted by the League was completed
in 1975 and included 19 of the 39 counties in the State of Washington in its sample.
In the interviews of caseworkers. judges. and attorneys in each of these counties this
author's research questionnaires were used. The findings of that study concur with
those discussed in this comment.
91. One commentator has recently stated the underlying premise of the ques-
tions which were asked of the juveniles in this study:
Most youngsters . . . do understand what is at stake in juvenile delinquency
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viously,92 and therefore knew what to expect in the process, most of
the young people interviewed indicated that prior to this court appear-
ance they had been told what to expect and how to act by friends,
caseworkers, or parents. The advice most often given was to "sit there
and say nothing" or "do what you're told and you'll get out quicker."93
Virtually all the youngsters indicated that they would listen in court
and answer all questions politely. "It's best to answer or they'll think
you're hiding something," said one. It therefore appears that the
youths felt being cooperative was more important than asserting their
privilege against self-incrimination, perhaps because there was a
feeling the judge would be more lenient if the juvenile cooperated. 94
With respect to the anticipated behavior of the judges and attorneys
there was less consensus and a considerable amount of hedging. Most
of the youngsters refused to express an opinion about what the judge
would do in court or how he would act toward them.95 Of those who
did venture to hypothesize, most expressed their beliefs in result-ori-
ented terms, e.g., the judge may "send me up," "find me dependent
proceedings. They understand that they are in trouble, why they are in trouble,
and what can happen to them once they are found to be juvenile delinquents.
They are not too innocent to play the role of criminal defendant.
Wizner, Tire Child and the State: Adversaries in the Juvenile Justice System, 4 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 389, 399 (1972). See generally W. CAVENAGH, JUVENILE
COURTS, THE CHILD AND THE LAW 212-17 (rev. ed. 1967).
92. Twenty-five of the 31 juveniles in the sample had appeared in juvenile court
before, at least to the point of intake.
93. The following exchange occurred during an interview with a King Countyjuvenile awaiting his first appearance in court:
Q. What you are going to do in court? What do you think will happen to you?
A. Best to act scared, sorry for doing it whether you are or not. It's bad to have
to be that way but I'll do it if it keeps me from getting sent up. You gotta be
really good to lie but you don't need to tell them all your beliefs. Just tell the
truth about what happened when the law was broken. You can argue with police
but you have to be nice to the judge. You know, he [the judge] let me out of
jail once just for saying I was sorry.
Confidential interview with a King County juvenile, in Seattle, Washington, Aug. 1973.
94. In response to the question: "What do you think is the best way to act injuvenile court?" Five indicated that it was advisable to "sit there and say nothing."
Five others expressed a similar feeling: "Do what you're told and you get out
quicker." The juveniles in Walla Walla showed a marked tendency to mention feel-
ings i.e. "act scared," or "act polite." All but two of the nine Walla Walla juveniles
felt that it was best "to play it cool and not press your rights."
95. Twenty-one of the 31 juveniles refused to express an opinion as to the judge's
possible reaction to them. The juveniles appeared to be more optimistic than some
critics of the court. One such commentator has stated: "[T] he general presumption
in juvenile court is that you're there because you're in trouble, and the problem is to
figure out what to do with you-not whether you're innocent." J. STROuSE, Up AGAINST
THE LAW: THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF PEOPLE UNDER TWENTY-ONE 210 (1970). See also
H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968), for a discussion of the
operational content of the presumption of innocence.
725
Washington Law Review Vol. 51: 697, 1976
but not incorrigible. " 96 The final disposition of the individual's case
was such an overwhelming concern that even those who were awaiting
an adjudicatory hearing tended to perceive it in relation to the ulti-
mate punitive end.
The young people interviewed were equally uncertain about the
role that their attorney would play in the hearing. 97 Although they
indicated that a good deal of time had been spent in communication
with legal counsel, a number of them indicated that the attorney had
either not told them of his plans for the hearing or that the attorney
would do what the caseworker told him to do. The ideal attorney was
generally depicted as one who would present "your side of the case,"
and "work to get you out of trouble as soon as possible."
Despite a predominately medium to high rating on indicators of
over-all cynicism, 98 the young respondents refused to indict the system
96. Ten of the 31 respondents were willing to venture a guess as to the probable
reaction of the judge to their case. Of these, the most frequent prediction aside from
speculation about the outcome, was that the judge would "do what the caseworker
told him to do." Of the 22 respondents who stated an opinion on a more general
question regarding the relative impact of their personal characteristics in the decision
of the judge, eight thought that such personal factors weighed heavily but 22 felt that
the facts of the particular case were more important to the judge.
One respondent in Walla Walla County summarized a host of factors perceived by
many of the other juveniles in the sample:
[The result] all depends on what the judge thinks of you-in juvenile court facts
don't matter so much. Some judges are just trying to send you up anyway.
S'okay to be polite but you don't have to answer stuff that'll incriminate you.
Judges like rich guys-like when your parents are outstanding in the community.
They don't like poor people and long-hairs. Everybody can't afford clothes, you
know; your best clothes might be grubbies to a judge.
Confidential interview with a Walla Walla County juvenile, in Walla Walla. Wash-
ington, Mar. 1973.
97. Only 5 were not i'epresented by counsel. The most frequent reason given for
the absence of an attorney was that the juvenile wished to plead "guilty." Of those
juveniles with attorneys, all but three were court-appointed. It is interesting to note
that almost half of the respondents (12 of the 26 represented by an attorney) per-
ceived that the attorney had been appointed by their caseworker.
98. The cynicism scale for this study is a compilation of responses to the follow-
ing questions:
Pre-Hearing: On the next group of questions, I'd like you to tell me whether you
agree or disagree with the statement I read.
1. Most politicians are looking out for themselves above all else.
2. Both major political parties in this country are run for the benefit of the people.
3. Most politicians can be trusted to do what is right for the people.
4. A poor man has the same chance as anyone else in a court of law.
5. It's no use worrying my head about politics, I can't do anything about the
issues anyhow.
One point is given for each affirmative response to statements 2. 3. and 4. An affirma-
tive response to statements 1 and 5, cynical pronouncements. receives no points.
High cynicism on this block of questions is evidenced by a score of 0-1. Ten respon-
dents (two from Walla Walla) were classified as highly cynical according to this
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as arbitrary, for approximately 75 per cent thought that the facts of
the case would weigh more heavily in the adjudication than any feel-
ings which the judge might have about them personally. But, although
most denied that the facts as stated by the complainant in the petition
were true, fewer than half of the respondents were willing to predict
that their story would be believed in court. 99 This pessimistic outlook
may in part be a function of the prevailing notion among the juveniles
that since the judge routinely follows the recommendation made by
the caseworker as to disposition, he must also rely upon the casework-
er's social report at the fact-finding stage.100 In general, therefore,
expectations of being treated favorably by the court were low. The
Walla Walla data, however, indicated that a more informal juvenile
court system may result in better relations between the juvenile and
his caseworker and as a consequence lead to more favorable and
knowledgeable expectations about the court experience. In King
County a greater percentage of young people go through the formal
measurement; only 7 respondents (three of whom were part of the Walla Walla sam-
ple) were rated as low in cynicism, the rest scored in the middle ranges.
99. This seems consistent with the way in which most of these young people
respond to other stressful situations in which they may be required to exercise some
individual control over the outcome. A control-of-life scale was developed from the
responses to the following questions contained in the post-hearing questionnaire:
1. If you think a policeman is wrong in what he tells you to do what should you
do?
a. Do what he tells you and forget about it.
b. Do what he tells you but tell a parent or some other adult.
c. Do what he tells you but ask him why.
d. Do what he tells you but tell him he's wrong.
e. Don't do what he tells you.
2. Everyone likes to decide things his own way. Which of these ways of feeling
about things fits you. Just answer Yes, No, or Sometimes after I read each state-
ment.
a. I would rather decide things when they come up than always try to plan
ahead.
b. I have always felt that my life would work out the way I wanted it to.
c. I seem to be the kind of person that has more bad luck than good luck.
d. There's not much use for me to plan ahead because there's usually some-
thing that makes me change my plans.
e. I nearly always feel pretty sure of myself even when people disagree with
me.
f. I have often had the feeling that it's no use to try to get anywhere in life.
A high score for control of life is evidenced by affirmative responses to statements (b)
and (e) of question 2 (valued at two points each) in combination with either 1(c),
l(d), or I(e). A single point is given for agreement with statement 2(a). Only three
of the respondents received a score to 5-6 on this scale indicating a strong sense of
control over the forces in their lives. Twelve respondents received scores between 0
and 2; the other respondents occupied the middle range.
100. One young King County respondent was adamant: "You can't win without
the caseworker on your side." But see WASH. Joy. CT. R. 4.4 (1968) which specifically
proscribes consideration of the social file in connection with the fact-finding hearing.
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juvenile court process than in Walla Walla County, and therefore re-
latively fewer juveniles in King County have extensive pre-hearing
contact with caseworkers.' 0 '
B. Post-Hearing Reactions
Reactions of the juveniles subsequent to their hearings support the
conclusions of Justice Fortas in the Gault decision that a denial of
"fundamental fairness"10 2 will give rise to a dysfunctionally negative
perception of the legitimacy of the entire juvenile procedure. Thus, a
higher degree of dissatisfaction with the court process was evident
among the Walla Walla respondents and those in King County who
had not been afforded counsel than among those appearing with an
attorney. 10 3 There was also evidence of a media-influenced anticipa-
tion of the nature of the fact-finding hearing and of the roles that the
judge and attorney would play.' 04
A considerable number of youngsters were unwilling or unable to
relate what had occurred in the courtroom. 10 5 Many of those involved
101. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
102. In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1. 26 (1966). The opinion cites the example of a study
done by Wheeler & Cottrell. supra note 11.
103. Satisfaction with the process was measured from a compilation of the fol-
lowing questions from the post-hearing questionnaire:
I'd like your opinion now on some statements I'll make. Tell me whether you
think they are mostly true or mostly false.
a. My caseworker listened to me all of the time.
b. My court hearing took less time than it should have.
c. In court, the judge was fair all of the time.
d. When I saw my caseworker he did all of the talking.
e. All of the things said in court were true.
f. My caseworker was never fair.
g. My caseworker understood me most of the time.
h. Most of the judges and caseworkers try to help people.
i. Juvenile courts almost never make the right decision.
Agreement with statements (a), (b), (e). (g). and (h) were valued at one point each
and served as the basis for a determination that the juvenile was generally satisfied
with his court experience. Eleven respondents (two from Walla Walla) scored be-
tween seven and nine points on this scale. Eight respondents. including three from
Walla Walla and five from King County (three of whom were not represented by an
attorney during their appearances in court) scored from 0 to 3 points. The rest of
the respondents occupied the middle range. These results were not statistically sig-
nificant.
104. When asked whether the hearing was like they had expected it to be. 12 of
th6 24 responding to the question replied in the negative. When asked to explain how
the procedure differed from their expectations. seven referred to their experience
with television programs and motion picture courtroom dramas.
105. Only 14 of the 31 juveniles responded to all of the post-hearing questions
dealing with the judge's demeanor and their reaction to the outcome. By contrast.
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in disposition hearings indicated that they had seen the caseworker's
report which had confirmed their previous suspicions that it had influ-
enced the judge's decision. 106 In response to specific questions con-
cerning the demeanor of the judge, however, most opined that he had
been interested in them.10 7 This belief seemed to be based more on a
general feeling about the judge's attitude than on what the judge ac-
tually said. In general, the judge was viewed more favorably in the
more formal setting prevalent in King County than in the less formal
Walla Walla system.108
The attorneys received a resounding vote of confidence, 10 9 al-
though in Walla Walla County attorneys were perceived to have been
less helpful." 0 They were generally perceived as doing a "good job"
in spite of obstacles presented by the caseworker and the judge. This
affirmative response remained consistently high throughout the post-
the physical description of the courtroom was given in fair detail by 21 of the re-
spondents.
106. Ten of the 19-respondents who were involved in disposition hearings indi-
cated that they had either seen the caseworker's report or had had it explained to
them by their caseworker or attorney. Eight of those ten felt, however, that its con-
tents were "unfair." Of those who had not seen the report, only five stated that they
thought that they should have been entitled to read it prior to the time of disposition.
Within both groups of respondents, 17 expressed the opinion that the social worker's
report influenced the judge's decision, with eight stating that the report was more
influential than the facts of their case.
107. The respondents were asked the following questions to determine their re-
action to the demeanor of the judge during their hearing:
Q. Did the judge seem interested in you? Why do you say that?
Q. Did the judge threaten you?
Thirteen of the 24 responding to these questions indicated that the judge did seem in-
terested in them, but 11 others felt that his facial expression showed disinterest or
that he was not listening to what was occurring in the courtroom. The overwhelming
majority of the respondents saw no threatening gestures on the part of the judge
(23 of 27 total responding). This finding is contrary to the earlier study by Paul Lip-
sitt, Judge-Boy Communications in Juvenile Court, supra note 11.
108. Five of the nine juveniles in Walla Walla perceived that the judge was dis-
interested in them and their case while only seven of the 20 in King County had a
similar reaction. This finding was not statistically significant. But see note 115 infra.
109. Only one of the 19 respondents stating an opinion, a King County juvenile,
indicated that he felt his lawyer did not care what happened to him. All agreed that
the lawyer had tried to have them sent home or to the least restrictive dispositional
alternative. Slightly fewer than half of the juveniles indicated that their lawyer had
been to see them often even though a check by the author determined that only three
of the attorneys had seen their clients more than twice during the entire process.
Fourteen of the respondents reported that their attorney had discussed the juvenile's
problems with him; only five stated that their attorney had never consulted with them.
Compare Comment, The Lawyer-Child Relationship: A Statistical Analysis, 9 Du-
QUESNE L. REV. 627 (1971).
110. Four of the eight responding Walla Walla juveniles indicated that they would
not recommend getting an attorney for a juvenile proceeding whereas none of the 23
responding King County juveniles so stated.
729
Washington Law Review Vol. 51: 697, 1976
hearing interview, and resulted in both an overstatement of the time
spent with the attorney and a shift in feelings as to the degree of per-
sonal concern which the attorney relayed to his client.1" At this point
it is evident that the caseworker has lost the allegiance of the juvenile
client for it is the caseworker who is characterized as the symbol of
injustice not the prosecuting attorney. 112 If, as is the case for a ma-
jority of the youths in juvenile court, the ultimate decision is seen as
unfair, the attorney may provide a necessary element to its acceptance
and may be a legitimizing factor beyond the more usual adversary
function in insuring the reliability of a fact-finding procedure.
C. Generalized Attitudes Toward the Components of the Legal
Process
The data suggest that juveniles who are participants in the juvenile
legal process feel that courts in general are only fair to certain people
-the tendency is only slightly more pronounced in the rural-informal
setting of Walla Walla juvenile court but is almost uniform
throughout the responses of the young females in both counties. Their
beliefs are attributed to experience with a system they find to be arbi-
trary or inequitable regardless of formalisms. "People who break
laws" may or may not be caught depending upon "who they are" not
"what the law is."1 13
Ill. See note 109 supra. In response to the question: "If one of your friends asks
you what they should do if they have to come to juvenile court, what would you tell
him?," 14 juveniles, the largest single category of respondents, stated that their first
order of priority would be to "get a lawyer." The next most frequent piece of advice
(from six respondents) was to "tell the truth."
Compare the findings from questionnaires administered to 500 youths residing in
Pennsylvania juvenile institutions and 100 attorneys with respect to perceptions of
the quality of representation in juvenile proceedings. Most of the juveniles agreed
that the attorney had not tried his best and that he had not spoken enough at the
hearing. Some stated that their attorneys had not even attended the hearing that re-
sulted in their commitment. Comment. supra note 109, at 635.
112. The actual authority of the prosecutor in King County was almost totally
unrecognized. When asked to recall the persons present at his hearing, only five
juveniles, who were otherwise accurate in their recollection, listed the deputy prose-
cuting attorney.
113. Though the question was phrased to elicit a response to the procedural as
opposed to the dispositional aspects of the process, the responses are more appro-
priately analyzed in terms of the latter. Yet, interestingly, when asked whether the
courts should apply general rules the same way all the time. or judge each person
by a different standard. 18 of the juveniles opted for the application of different




A comparison of juveniles in the two counties, however, indicates
that although a majority of the juveniles in both counties feel that the
legal system is discriminatory in general, a higher percentage of Walla
Walla juveniles thought so than did King County juveniles.114 More-
over, as the data indicated, among those juveniles who go through the
King County system, three positive attitudes are more prevalent than
among those juveniles who go through the Walla Walla system. First,
offenders perceive the juvenile court judge as interested and caring. 11 5
Second, attorneys are perceived as helpful and supportive of the
child's rights. 1 6 Third, young offenders would use the courts to liti-
gate a personal matter or to otherwise defend their rights as citi-
zens. 117 Thus, if as a result of positive feelings toward the legal system
an offender is more likely to become reformed because of his recogni-
tion of the legitimacy of law and his duty to avoid anti-social behav-
ior, the juvenile who is exposed to the more formal King County juve-
nile court system is more likely to become rehabilitated than the juve-
nile who is exposed to the less formal Walla Walla County system.1 18
114. Five out of eight juveniles in Walla Walla were more likely to feel that the
legal system in general was discriminatory as compared with 12 out of 23 in King
County. Another statistically significant indicator of the King County juveniles' more
positive perception of the juvenile court process was that the Walla Walla juveniles
were unanimous in feeling that "kids who have lawyers get all the breaks," whereas
only two of the 17 King County respondents thought that juveniles with counsel
were favored. This finding is significant to the .001 level.
115. See note 108 and accompanying text supra. Another indicator of positive
attitude, significant to the .01 level, was that none of the nine Walla Walla respondents
felt that the courts were doing a "good job," -but I 1 out of 16 King County re-
spondents did.
116. See notes 109-110 and accompanying text supra.
117. In one instance, the juveniles were asked to respond to the following hypo-
thetical situation:
If someone stole something that belonged to you, which of these things, if any,
would you do?
a. Go after him yourself.
b. Call the police.
c. Sue him in court.
d. Nothing.
e. None of these things (name other).
Nine of the 21 responding King County ju-veniles chose alternatives (b) or (c), as
compared to two of the eight responding Walla Walla juveniles, thus possibly indi-
cating greater confidence in, and reliance on, the criminal justice system. This result,
however, was not statistically significant.
118. Recently one Seattle paper noted that most Seattle juvenile crimes dropped
off in 1975 and that the trend had continued during the first quarter of 1976. While
giving most of the credit for the drop to the Rapid Referral and Monitoring Project,
see note 23 supra, another reason noted for the drop was the 'fact that prosecutors
were taking more youngsters into court rather than settling matters more informally
with discussions among the judge, caseworker, accused and his legal guardians. Nalder,




The policy-making implications of this study are numerous. Juve-
nile crime engenders concern for the types of agencies empowered to
deal with youthful offenders. Analysis of how behavior is shaped by
experience with the judicial process may also give part of the answer
to questions regarding juvenile recidivism rates. Further, any evalua-
tion of the success of reform movements in juvenile court, whether
legalistic or sociologically-oriented, can only be evaluated properly
with consideration given to the actual effect which they may be
having upon the clientele of the court.
Bobbe Jean Ellis*
Third-year law student, University of Washington; B.A., 1966. University of Wash-
ington. M.A., 1968. University of Michigan.
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